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programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual doom.




This dissertation will critically examine the United States Information Agency’s
(USIA) influence on the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s tyrannical government.’
in the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) from 1971 through 1991. This
case study shows Ethiopia as a principal geo-political actor during the Cold War.
Ethiopia’s location in the Horn of Africa was of key strategic importance for both the
United States and the Soviet Union. The USIA presented itself as a political education
organization that utilized the Voice of America (VOA) to spread its anti-communist
message abroad to foreign civilians.
The dissertation will analyze: 1. the degrees of freedom enjoyed by local
governments in running the nation’s affairs, 2. the number of elections held, and 3. the
limits on freedom of speech, expression, and democratic participation. In addition, an
educational review will examine: 1. the accessibility of knowledge, 2. the extent of
censorship, and 3. other restraints on academic freedoms. This historical analysis also
‘Hyden, Goran. African Politics in Comparative Perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2006, 100.
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reviews the legal framework that existed during this era and the role they played in
political, social, and educational outcomes. USIA utilized public diplomacy through mass
communication to influence Ethiopia’s civil war. VOA’s airing of the class divisions and
increase injustice caused by the Derg helped to develop a since of unity among the
masses being oppressed. When the Ethiopian Civil War did occur, VOA helped to
organize the diverse ethnic groups by being an outlet were many oppositional leaders
aired their ideals of overthrowing Mengistu. The USIA’s political education strategy
became one of the United States’ leading foreign policy initiatives in the nation. Scholars
have noted that political education has two main periods within the United States, the
first being the colonial era and the latter during the late 19th century.2
There are two conceptual distinctions of political education: 1. consensual versus
pluralistic approaches, and 2. the distinction between direct and indirect political
education. Political education’s indirect method was introduced in American colleges and
universities after World War II. It was started by the Harvard University Committee on
Education’s report. The Harvard Committee proposed a course called “Western Thought
and Institutions” to be the foundation of students’ political education. The course aimed
to highlight how progressive the ideology of individualism was and its role in
encouraging freedom as well as entrepreneurship among citizens. The course mainly
emphasized Western history and what was believed to be the development of “democratic
2 Reuben, Julie A. “Political Education of College Students: Learning from History.” 2008.
http://www.westmont.edulinstitutelconversations/2008program/pdfs/Political Education of College Stu
dents.pdf (accessed October 25, 2009).
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qualities.” This indirect approach of political education was used during the Cold War by
the USIA towards Ethiopia while Mengistu was in power.
The USIA serves as a model for how national agencies can engage in political
education through public diplomacy. There is a lingering argument, however, which
claims the USIA only spread propaganda and not political education in Ethiopia. In
response to this argument, one must note that there are distinctions between political
education and propaganda. Propaganda’s main goal is to manipulate the opinions of an
audience. It aims to shape one’s opinions, ideas, cognition and behavior through
manipulative and subtle means. Propaganda does not follow a scientific approach nor
mandates testing of all probabilities; neither does it strive to argue one’s opinions over
another’s perception on the subject, which may exist. Political education, however, does
follow the rules of scientific methodology. It utilizes historical facts, examines current
ideologies, and proposes solutions that have been tested against other government
systems in a comparative format.
This research will highlight the purpose and goals of the USIA and its overall
mission in Ethiopia during the years of Mengistu’s leadership. In addition, the research
will also include historical analyses of the Ethiopian government’s involvement with the
United States and its importance to the country during the Cold War, drawing back as
early as 1950. Furthermore, the research will analyze the link between the USIA and the
establishment of the Voice of America broadcast, through the passing of the Smith
Mundt Act in 1948. The research will also briefly highlight the individual goals that US
Ibid
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presidential administrations had for the USIA. Lastly, an examination will be made of the
USIA’s policy during the Cold War era drawing links to VOA activities in Ethiopia.
The research will examine Mengistu leadership from 1987 until his abdication in
1991 .The research, also examines Ethiopia under the rule of Derg in 1971, to highlight
the beginning of the country’s move towards communist policy and thereby becoming a
threat to American Foreign Policy. In this study, political education takes the form of
news coverage, news briefs, panel discussions, journal publications, radio broadcasting
and editorial opinions of United States policies. Lastly, the research argues that political
education is a useful strategy in American foreign policy.
Statement of Problem
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the USIA’s activities within the People’s
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1971 1991. The study examines the use of
political education to assist in the overthrow of the Marxist leader Mengistu Haile
Mariam of Ethiopia (1987-1991). This research also seeks to show the effectiveness in
utilizing public diplomacy in American foreign policy. The research aims to show that
public diplomacy is an influential alternative to military engagement. Ethiopia was
chosen as the case study to analyze the influence political education had on the overthrow
of Mengistu and the DERG. The data gathered shows the influence public diplomacy has
on the mass population. The researcher argues that political education and public
diplomacy can influence the populace, considering the socio-political atmosphere
provides for such a change. The research concludes that political education must be
sensitive to the history and culture of the intended audience. In addition, it must provide a
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means whereby the mass population of people can access the information. Furthermore,
there has to be a lingering resentment among the masses, which in the past have been
denied fair and equal representation in the country. Therefore, for public diplomacy to be
influential the masses must be at odds with the current government’s policies, which
denies them, equal representation and participation in the nation.
Thesis
This research examines how the United States Information Agency helped
influence political change in Ethiopia from 1987 through 1991. The dissertation argues
that the USIA utilized VOA broadcast in 1987 through 1991 to infuse political education
that opposed the Marxist-Leninist government of Mengistu in Ethiopia. It is argued that
these activities helped facilitate his overthrow by the Ethiopian Revolutionary People’s
Party and caused him to be exiled from the nation of Ethiopia. These examinations will:
1. Focus on how the USIA worked towards executing American foreign policy and
perspective around the world, through the use of political education via the VOA
radio broadcast.
2. Study the use of the agency under all Cold War presidents and underline the
individual goals of each administration in this era.
3. Explore the news and editorials of the USIA which published contrary views of
Mengitus’ rule and the Marxist-Leninist government.
4. Examine the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1987 to its
disbandment in 1991.
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The study will examine different forms of public diplomacy and its historical
relevance to American foreign policy. The research examines the continent of Africa and
the nation of Ethiopia during the leadership of Mengistu. Another question that will be
addressed is VOA authenticity in Marxist Ethiopia, and whether political education can
be critical but still hold to unbiased and objective facts.
Justification
Recent foreign policy discourse has considered forming stronger alliances with
Arab nations in the Middle East. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S.
presidential office and the U.S. Congress, along with departmental agencies, have
debated the best foreign policy to assist in protecting the United States’ interests around
the world from future threats. Since the 9/11 attack, the Department of Homeland
Security has been established to assist with counterterrorism intelligence on American
soil and in foreign territories. In addition, the United States has sent troops to occupy the
nations of Iraq and Afghanistan, to assist towards their democratization and in the War on
Terror. Incidentally, the USIA, just two years prior to the 9/11 attacks, had been
dissolved. The USIA has recently been mentioned as a useful organization that can help
countries progress towards democratization and anti-terrorist tactics in foreign territories.
7
Definitions
Public Dz~lomacy: The Department of State defines public diplomacy as a “government
sponsored program intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries.”4
Political/Civic Education: As defined by Amy Gutmann and Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, it is political education that cultivates virtues, knowledge, and skills
necessary for political participation.5
Methodology
Since the hypothesis of this study argues that USIA was partially responsible for
the overthrow of Mengistu Halie Mariam’s government in Ethiopia through the use of the
VOA, it is essential to examine the nation’s sentiment towards his governance prior to the
agency’s involvement. Hence, the methodological approach used is a comparative
analysis of the socio- political and educational conditions that existed prior to Mengistu’s
usurpation of control of Ethiopia in 1987. Furthermore, the approach will examine the
historical affects of the Cold War and American foreign policy on the continent of Africa
and the nation of Ethiopia. The study will draw on the most recent data available,
including available statistical data of USIA records that show the effects of political
education in Ethiopia during from 1971-1991.
~ Rosen, Brian and Charles Wolf Jr. Public Diplomacy: Lessons From King and Mandela.
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/2921496.htm (accessed September 21, 2009).
~ Lane, Eric. “For Democracy Journal: America 101 .“ Democracyjournal.
http:/!www.democracyjournal.org/10/6643.php?page=all (accessed 142011, January).
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This study employs the following methods for gathering data: 1. literature review
and content analysis of government documents, books, journals, USIA archives, records,
and newspapers on relevant material to this research. 2. Discussion with Ethiopians who
were academics or citizens during this era, as well as interviews with former USIA, as
well as VOA employees and agents who worked on the Ethiopia project within the
agencies. While these individuals may not constitute a representative sample of the
Ethiopian population during this time, their testimonies and observations will provide
insight on the influence of the United States in general and the use of VOA in particular.
It has been difficult to gather historical documents on Ethiopia during the
designated time frame because USIA is no longer in existence. The Cold War remains a
sensitive topic in many Ethiopian citizens’ minds, especially in a nation that still suffers
from the war’s fallout. In addition, agency personnel are reluctant to speak on issues that
are seen as confidential when addressing the extent of American involvement in Ethiopia
during this time. For this reason, the research incorporates unstructured interviews with
resistance leaders to Mengistu, and government officials in order to gather and extract
field information under such rigid circumstances. In addition, specific research was
conducted on VOA’s involvement in the nation. Furthermore, literature was examined on
the U.S. agenda in North Africa during the Cold War.
Literature Review
A fair amount of literature has examined the United States Information Agency’s
use of “public diplomacy” through the Voice of America broadcast. Scholars like W.
Lance Bennett, James Dawes, David Frum, and Sandra Silberstein address the linguistic
9
aspects of public diplomacy. Researchers, such as Allen Heil, Joseph S. Nye, Richard
Arndt, and William Bundy contributed to documenting the history of VOA activities
abroad. Many other scholars discuss the influence of public diplomacy. There is an
extreme task of scanning through this literature because of the limitation in research that
merely examines public diplomacy influence in Foreign Policy. The research is further
complicated by the multiple opinions and biases of these authors.
Many studies cited in this research reveal political education as a vital strategy in
foreign policy. Furthermore, it presents case studies and actual observations performed of
civic education and public diplomacy initiatives in the continent of Africa. In addition,
the dissertation reviews the literature on how political education has influenced the
social, political, and economic situation in a country.
Influence of Public Diplomacy
Since 1989, questions have been posed about the usefulness of the USIA in
American foreign policy. USIA’s activities were so covert during the Cold War era that
some believed the organization was ineffective abroad. On the contrary, Yale Richmond
in his study Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (Explorations in Culture
and International History) argues that public diplomacy can be remarkably effective. He
does, however, argue that actual change could take a long time to occur. He explains that
public diplomacy requires diverse approaches in order for the desired foreign policy
objective to be achieved. Richmond agrees that “soft power” education can assist in
spreading American values. He gives examples on how successful “American Houses”
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were in teaching German citizens the civic process in a democratic government.
American Houses were cultural centers that taught German students on American’s social
practices. Richmond’s theory has not been tested in areas like Africa, however, which
have been affected by imperialism and colonization.6
Louis Belanger’s study, “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and
Foreign Policy in Canada,” explains how cultural diplomacy in foreign policy is
becoming more of a necessity because of globalization. Foreign policies have been
developed that seek to maintain a nation’s individual identity while integrating in the
global economy. Belanger writes:
Thus, the issue I address here is not the politicization of cultural diplomacy,
but rather how the linkages between culture and foreign policy are changing
in a context of growing cultural insecurity. In the past, foreign policy made
“instrument-taP’ use of culture to support generally political and economic
objectives, whereas today it finds itself in the often uncomfortable position of
having to openly intervene in the cultural sphere.7
Belanger explains how cultural diplomacy can cause skepticism and even
rebellion when a nation seeks to vehemently educate its citizens in the ideal social,
political, educational and economic structure. Considering this possibility, one turns to
Jennifer Mitzen’s study of Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and
Global Public Spheres. She highlights how states often justify their foreign policy
6 Richmond, Yale. Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (Explorations in Culture
and International History). Berghahn Books , 2008.
~ Belanger, Louis. “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in
Canada.” International Society ofPolitical Psychology Vol. 20, Dec 1999: 677
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initiatives through open forums of mass communication to citizens. Mitzens claims that
these forums deter violence globally and domestically. She states:
Internationally, I propose that international society and publicity function
similarly. Public talk can mitigate the security dilemma and enable interstate
communicative action. Viewing multilateral diplomacy as a legitimating
process makes sense of the intuition that interstate talk matters, while
tempering a potentially aggressive cosmopolitanism.8
In contrast to Mitzen’s main argument, communication can spark violence in
politically unstable nations. She goes on to admit that mass communication can provoke
violence if the political situation in a nation that has previously been anarchic. However,
one must note that interstate mass communication has proven to be effective in sustaining
peace efforts amongst rival nations.9 This observation agrees with the theory that public
diplomacy may have different effects depending on the political situation in the country.
Mark Leonard explains in his report, “Diplomacy by Other Means”, that
propaganda through mass communication alone doesn’t start wars. He further argues that
negative perceptions arising from misinformation cause wars among nations. He claims
perception can impede the formation of diplomatic alliances amongst nations. Hence,
Leonard acknowledges the need for objectivity and concise educational forums that
8 Mitzen, Jennifer. “Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public
Spheres.’ Political Science Review, 99, 3, 2005: 401
~ Ibid
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properly explains different nation’s government forms and political policies among
neighboring countries and their citizens.’0
Public Diplomacy and Technology
Kim Andrew Elliot agrees with some parts of Leonard’s study. She explains in
Too Many Voices ofAmerica that the international broadcast, VOA, is favored among
foreign soil due to the lack of local radio networks. Many foreign citizens desire some
alternative to government-controlled and biased news coverage. During the Cold War,
VOA was seen among foreign citizens as a more legitimate broadcast for global events.
Ethiopians citizens still speak favorably about the network’s balanced coverage. Elliot
further explains how Western entertainment helps expand US broadcast in foreign
nations. Furthermore, Elliot explains how entertainment and radio broadcasting provides
the United States a larger forum to spread ideas of democracy, human rights, and
capitalism. The United States has been able to spread its ideas and foreign policies
through the entertainment industry’s technological advancements and radio broadcasting.
Hence, through technological advancements the US will now have greater access to
establishing new political educational forums around the world.”
Hans N. Tuch’s study, “Communicating with the world: U.S. Public Diplomacy
Overseas” details how gaining publicity on political issues and garnering the public’s
10 Leonard, Mark. “Diplomacy by Other Means.” Washington Post Newsweek No. 132, Sept-Oct.
2002: 48-56.
~ Elliott, Kim Andrew. ‘Too Many Voices of America .“ Washington Post Newsweek No.77,
1989-1990: 113-131.
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attention is a crucial factor in spreading public diplomacy through media. Tuch claims
that public diplomacy coincides with America’s ideas of free speech and expression. For
this reason, the ideas of public diplomacy resonate with common citizens, especially
those who have endured a history of oppression. He acknowledges the expansion of
technology during World War II and the lasting effects it had on international
relationships following the war. Now more than ever, the government can communicate
directly with people in other nations through transistor radios, television, satellite
transmissions, supersonic jet transportation, international computer link-ups, electronic
data processing, and telefax. This flow of information allows for the United States to
have a direct outlet for presenting alternative views to people all over the world. Ideas
such as democracy, capitalism, liberalism, and republicanism are discussions that citizens
can examine through the lens of Americans who have lived said ideas and government
forms.’2
Lance W. Bennett in Civic Learning in Changing Democracies: Challenges for
Citizenship and Civic Education discusses how modernization in the expansion of
industries can impact the involvement of political participation amongst populations. He
claims, however, that the means by which younger generations have been presented civic
education has not changed with the times, but has increased in areas of social interaction
with other cultures and citizens around the world. Technology has allowed radio
broadcasts from many different countries to be heard internationally. This new
12 Tuch, Hans N, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (N.Y.: St.
Martins Press, 1990) 58
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international broadcasting capacity has created opportunities for civilians around the
world to engage in socio-political and economic discussion with each other.13
Bennett argues that current generations can utilize high-tech improvements in
spreading civic education and mobilizing towards common ideological goals. However,
he discusses how the method of encouraging the use of political education through new
technology is presently lagging. Thus, Bennett argues that political education should be
presented in a means whereby everyday citizens are able to understand and have access to
the information.
Public Diplomacy through Political Education
Steven Finkel and Howard R Ernst in their study Civic Education in Post-
Apartheid South Africa: Alternative Paths to the Development ofPolitical Knowledge
and Democratic Values conducted an in-depth analysis of how civic education has real,
lasting effects on educating South African students in political knowledge. He, however,
claims that political education is not as effective towards establishing democratic values,
skills, and participation without the ability to expand the conversation in a diverse and
open environment for all people to hear and participate. He further argues that the needed
educational growth can only come through actual kinesthetic instruction, which will
13 Bennett, W. Lance. ‘Civic Learning in Changing Democracies: Challenges for Citizenship and
Civic Education.Citation Only Available By: Bennett, W. Lance. “American Political Science Association,
2005: 1-31.
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allow for free, open discussion and cognitive development that’s not influenced by one
ideological perspective.’4
Troy A. Murphy’s work, “Deliberative Civic Education and Civil Society: a
consideration of ideals and actualities in democracy and communication education,”
explains how deliberation in the form of academic dialogue can enhance political
democratic participation among citizens. He argues that this style of intellectual dialogue
should begin at the college level. He feels this deliberating forum can act as a medium or
mediator, which allows for the average citizen to express their feelings toward
government.’5 Murphy’s general theory is that civic education has a lasting effect on the
perception of how citizens view their nation.
Patricia White furthers Murphy’s theory, suggesting that civic education should
be presented at the first stages of learning in primary school, in her study “Political
Education in the Early Years: the place of civic virtues.” Considering both proposals, the
USIA blended an agenda that encouraged international student exchange and established
a collegiate program that engaged young people with different views and opinions. This
14 Finkel, Steven E. and Ernst, Howard R. “Civic Education in Post-Apartheid South Africa:
Alternative Paths to the Development of Political Knowledge and Democratic Values.” Political
Psychology ,2005: 333-364.
15 Murphy, Troy A. “Deliberative civic education and civil society: a consideration of ideals and
actualities in democracy and communication educatio.” Communication Education, 2004: 74-91.
16
newfound respect for diverse cultures, enabled by civic education, shows the influence
political education can have on modem societies pursuing global peace.’6
Satu Riutta in Does Civic Education Promote Participation?: Proposing an
Explanatory Model with Cognitive and Attitudinal Change further discusses the
limitation of civic education on populations in Africa due to the effect of other variables
which may exist within individual nations. Riutta claims that increased pressure from
aristocrats to oppress the population can hinder political participation. He states that
political education is able to influence cognitive development and instill an innovative
spirit, which allows for more self-sufficiency and independence amongst citizens.
Riutta’s research explains how self-dependency and the freedom of political participation
can prevent the rise of tyrant regimes, such as Mengistu’s in Ethiopia.’7
Elizabeth Buk-Berge argues that in post-communist countries, there has not been a
sufficient examination of the impact of political education on new, developing
democracies. She agrees that there remains work to be done, which will bring the
research up to date beyond the Cold War era. She claims there is a lack of analysis of
communist Europe’s inability to bring about civic education. In addition, Buk-Berge and
16 White, Patricia. “Political Education in the Early Years: the place of civic virtues.” Oxford
Review ofEducation , 1999: 59-70.
17 Riutta, Satu. “Does Civic Education Promote Participation?: Proposing an Explanatory Model
with Cognitive and Attitudinal Change.” A merica Political Science Association , 2006: 1-52.
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other scholars mentioned in this review all acknowledge that in order for political
education to be effective, there must be open and untainted dialogue of information.’8
18 Buk-Berge, Elisabeth. “Missed opportunities: the lEA’s study of civic education and civic
education in post-communist countries.” Comparative Education ,2006: 533-548.
Chapter II
United States Information Agency
USIA Background History
Since World War I, public diplomacy has been utilized by the Public Information
Committee in the United States. The Creel Committee (Committee on Public
Information) was organized during the First World War as an independent agency that
aim was to influence US public opinion in support of the war effort)9 The Creel
Committee focused primarily on explaining America’s global military objectives. When
Nazi Germany strove to develop a subversive position in South America, Franklin D.
Roosevelt established a cultural exchange program with Latin countries to counter those
activities in that region.
Two major events are credited for causing America to utilize information in the
form of public diplomacy overseas, the first being the Cold War. The Cold War marked a
new opportunity for America’s expansion of influence. In addition, the conflict created a
global nuclear threat arising from the newly emerging nuclear capability of the
communist Soviet Union. Second, the nation was responsible for overseeing and
developing strong diplomatic relationships with Japan, Germany, and Austria.




Although, Roosevelt initiated the move towards public diplomacy through the
culture exchange program, it was President Truman, however, who incorporated public
diplomacy into the fabric of American foreign affairs. He felt that it was essential to
maintain informational activities in the new modern era of global politics. In 1950,
Truman laid out his intentions for political education as a tool of public diplomacy in the
Campaign of Truth speech, in which he related communist expansion to the domination
of humanity’s ability to consciously decide how they choose to live. He explained the
need to counter “propaganda” from communist countries through the spread of pure
political education. The instruments projected to spread this information extended from
radio, to newspapers, newsreel, and all assumed “trustworthy sources.”
USIA’s Founding
The founding of the USIA started with the Commercial and Cultural Affairs
Department of the Department of State, which admitted 130 Latin American journalists
to the United States in 1940. Following the journalists’ visit, private networks of fourteen
shortwave transmitters begin to broadcast the Voice of America in 1942. Shortly after
VOA’s founding, the Office of War Information (OWl) was also established in 1942. The
department was established to consolidate all foreign and domestic information agencies
within the United States. The OWl would be reorganized by Harry S. Truman in 1946
when it merged with the Office of Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) within the
State department. The OIC had 67 information centers and libraries used to display films
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and exhibits that gave access to a massive book archive. During this period, the VOA
broadcast aired in 24 languages globally.
Throughout 1946, the OCI had a network of 76 branches. OCI networks had the
capability to send wireless communication to Washington daily. The OIC would be
renamed again in 1947 as the Office of Information and Educational Exchange. In 1978,
the United States Information Agency briefly changed to the United States International
Communication Agency. At this time, the agency combined the Bureau of Education and
Cultural Relations from the State Department. In 1982, Reagan named the organization
USIA once more; however, he did not change the organization’s mission.
USIA’s Mission and Purpose
In 1948, Representative Karl E. Mundt and Senator Alexander Smith advocated
for the use of public diplomacy in American foreign policy, and their appeal allowed the
USIA to become a permanent organization. Therefore, in 1948 the Smith-Mundt helped
to establish USIA as the main agency that would engage in public diplomacy in foreign
countries. In addition, this act helped to legitimize the agency’s efforts to build stronger
relations with foreign nations. When President Dwight Eisenhower was elected in 1952,
he merged all information services with the USIA. In 1953, the United States Information
Agency (USIA) was founded as independent bureaucratic wing of the presidency office.
Its principal purpose and responsibility was foreign policy in the form of public
diplomacy. During this time Eisenhower established a new mission statement for the
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USIA. He encouraged the agency to submit information to other nations in an aim to
secure harmony and peace abroad; the main objective was to convey information.
The USIA’s mission focused on transforming the world’s economic and political
structure to more democratic and free market capability. In order to keep with this global
mission, the USIA presented American political values and cultural perspectives to
Africa, Latin America, Asia, as well as Eastern and Western Europe. The organization’s
aim was to: (1.) advocate for American’s foreign policy abroad through diplomacy, while
respecting the culture and heritage of each nation, (2.) Explain the policies and values of
the United States, including not only those of its citizens but the leaders as well, (3.)
Build relationships with foreign citizens and institutions abroad, (4.) Stand as an advisory
agency to the President by explaining how foreign nations and citizens view American
foreign policy towards their individual nations.
Presidential Influence on USIA
As previously stated, USIA first started as an executive bureaucratic wing to the
White House. This warrants examination of what influences presidential administrations
had on the organization’s activities. Examining each presidential administration from
1969-1989 during the Cold War will further explain the course and actions taken by the
USIA to spread public diplomacy in foreign countries. The USIA was often caught
between the foreign policy disputes of the president and Congress during the era.
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Nixon and Ford, 1969-77
President Richard Nixon’s term in office exemplified how Congress often fought
with the presidency over foreign policy. In 1969, Congress was given greater decisional
power in military activities on foreign soil through the National Commitments Resolution
(1969). Later, in 1973, the War Power Act increased congressional power in foreign
policy. Many foreign policy decisions made by Nixon were sometimes halted or
influenced by Congress. For example, Nixon had to justify to Congress the decision to
send troops abroad by claiming America needed to defend property and troops overseas.
Due to the political protest against the Vietnam War, most foreign policy decisions had to
be cleared by Congress before going into effect. Congress was aware of the public
opinion against the war and would strive to hamper the president in any military
involvement overseas. Therefore, the recurring battle with Congress would hinder the
aims and goals of both USIA and VOA. Nixon, however, was able to exert major
influence on foreign policy. What’s surprising is that Nixon’s foreign policy during the
Cold War was focused more on military engagement as opposed to diplomacy. He is
known to have developed American foreign policy unilaterally, with only the assistance
of Secretary of State Kissinger. Nixon often isolated the State Department in all foreign
policy decisions. Thus, the USIA and VOA were very limited under his presidency. 20
20 Hughes, Thomas L, “INR’S Vietnam Study in Context,’ GWU~
http://www.gwu.eduknsarchiv/NSAEBBINSAEBB 12 1/hughes.htm (accessed Januray 12, 2010).
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President Ford’s influence on American foreign policy was similar to that of
Nixon in that it failed to make major strides in the use of USIA towards public
diplomacy. Ford kept Kissinger as Secretary of State and implemented similar policies as
the previous administration. During his time in office, the battle between Congress and
the presidency continued. Senator Henry Jackson managed to effect relaxation of Ford’s
emigration policies. These policies came into conflict with the Fuibright exchange
student program, sponsored by the USIA. Furthermore, Ford’s attempts at new treaties
and diplomacy, similar to SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty), failed to reach an
agreement. The CIA, known for covert operations, was also limited in its activities due to
a scandal that occurred within the agency in 1975. These failures caused Ford to turn his
attention towards the African continent. One can assert that it was during Ford’s
administration that Africa became a focal location in American foreign policy, thus
giving rise to USIA later activity on the continent.21
During both Ford’s and Nixon’s administrations, Congress became less willing to
approve money for military activities during the Cold War. Ford, in fact, found himself in
a constant battle with Congress when he directed the nation towards military involvement
with Angola. Therefore, it can be noted that Congress was more partial to funding
nonmilitary activities in Africa during the Cold War. Ford and Nixon’s administration
started to place more emphasis on détente, which focused on relaxing some of the tension
21 Baliles, Gerald L. Miller Center Public Affizirs. 2009.
http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresidentlford/essays/biography/5 (accessed December 12, 2009).
24
between the United States and the Soviet Union with the aim to forge a stronger
partnership among the two world superpowers. Détente thus required the United States to
start using more diplomacy instead of military aggression against the Soviets during the
Cold War. When détente was adopted as a main agenda for the country, public diplomacy
and the USIA became more relevant in foreign policy.22
Jimmy Carter 1977-8 1
James Earl Carter Jr. had no major experience in foreign policy when he became
president. Carter, however, entered office with his foreign policy centered on establishing
universal suffrage and human rights. He believed heavily in non-military intervention.
Thus, Carter’s foreign policy encouraged the growth of USIA and allowed the agency to
broaden its programs. To some, Carter’s foreign policy seemed to be more idealistic then
practical during the Cold War. He sought to bring the Cold War to an end and to increase
a global policy of relaxed nuclear proliferation. Carter envisioned universal human rights
and moral responsibility being the key principles that would cause freedom from the
arbitrary power of the state.
Carter had a mixed approach in dealing with foreign countries, but it focused on
diplomacy. Although, he planned to continue détente with the Soviets, his actions tended
to be more aggressive following their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Carter’s
administration, however, was able to build a stronger relationship with China through
diplomacy. In 1979, Carter met Deng Xiaoping, premier of China, to sign new accords to
22 Ibid
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reverse decades of US opposition. In the same year, Carter signed the Taiwan Relations
Act, recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the official government. While the
Carter administration was building strong relations with China, he had to assure that US
relationships with Taiwan didn’t completely decline. Hence, via the Taiwan Relations
Act, de facto diplomatic relations were established between the United States and
Taiwan. Forms of political education and quasi-diplomacy were used to secure the United
States’ interest in Taiwan. Overall, Carter’s administration was not as successful in its
use of diplomacy and securing America foreign policy abroad. Carter’s goals for human
rights sometimes contrasted with his lack of aggressiveness when dealing with tyrant
regimes in Iran, China, and even the Soviet Union.
Carter outlined five new goals of the USIA. The first was to encourage aid and the
sharing of ideas, as well as people amongst other countries. In addition, Carter felt the
agency should explain America’s efforts abroad, and expound on why the nation had
chosen certain policies and aims in these countries. Furthermore, he depended on the
government understanding other nations’ public opinions and distinct cultures. Carter
also felt the USIA’s mission should be to execute and help establish comprehensive
national policies to increase the flow of international information. Lastly, he sought to
develop strong cultural exchanges with other governments. What is most noteworthy in
Carter’s memos was that the agency, including its Radio Broadcast VOA, should
maintain “academic integrity and nonpolitical character.”23 Carter went on to say that
23 Ibid
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USIA should restrain from any manipulation and propagandistic activities. This aim by
Carter became the standard whereby VOA aimed to achieve while broadcasting and
being used towards USIA public diplomacy objectives.
Ronald Reagan, 1981-89
During Ronald Reagan’s presidency, his foreign policy was primarily aimed
towards containing the Soviet Union’s global influence. Reagan leaned more toward
Harry S. Truman’s policy of armament and military buildup, and his administration
concentrated on stopping the growth of Marxist governments around the world. He aimed
to fight Marxist regimes through assisting military insurgence groups globally. Reagan
supported what he called “Freedom Fighters” in the Caribbean (Cuba), South America
(El Salvador), and Africa (Angola). Reagan’s policy, cold war goals, and agendas at
times overlapped into the instability occurring in the Middle East, which caused a long
heated battle with congress. Reagan deployment of troops to Lebanon resulted in the
deaths of 241 American servicemen. When Reagan vowed to retaliate with air strikes, he
was however, denied this opportunity. In the midst of all these presidential
administrations the USIA’s goals stayed the same. Its mission was not altered.
USIA Directors
Since 1950, the United States has heavily practiced a policy of public diplomacy
in foreign affairs. As previously stated, the USIA was legislatively organized under the
Smith-Mundt Act as a result of reorganization plan #8 in 1953. From then on, the USIA
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served as the government’s main agency for public diplomacy abroad. During this time,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles kept USIA operations separate from those of the
State Department. The directors started to exert more influence on the direction of USIA
after it became independent from the State Department, which warrants an examination
of the directors’ activities and influence on the use of public diplomacy in American
foreign policy.
George Allen, 1957-60
George Allen was appointed director of USIA by Eisenhower in 1957. It was
under George Allen that the USIA aimed to make VOA world news broadcast
transmissions accurate, comprehensive and objective. Allen wanted VOA to be respected
like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which had gained acclaim for its
unbiased coverage of WWII. Hence, the USIA and VOA started to focus on becoming a
source for reliable, unbiased information in the world. The organization sought to gain
trust from the public, and by doing so established long term relationships and alliances.
Edward R. Murrow, 1961-1964
During Kennedy’s brief time in office, he appointed a director who became very
influential in establishing USIA’s legitimacy. Many were still skeptical of the USIA’s
activities as nothing short of propaganda. Even Senator Fuibright was skeptical of the
USIA’s supervision of the student exchange program because he feared it would become
a tool to spread propaganda. To help legitimize the agency, Kennedy appointed Edward
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R. Murrow chief director of USIA in 1961. Morrow was known for integrity, honesty,
and professionalism in the field ofjoumalism. With Murrow’s appointment, Kennedy
was able to gain approval from the bureaucracy. Murrow was an accomplished public
diplomat for years; he saw public diplomacy as a means to connect with everyday
citizens from other countries. Murrow sought to use public diplomacy in a way that
influenced people’s views and opinions on political issues. He desired political education
to transform the ideologies and decisions of the masses.
When Khrushchev broke with other leaders on the Nuclear test ban in 1958, and
continued with the atmospheric nuclear testing, it was Murrow who directed all VOA
transmitters to be directed towards Soviet citizens to inform them of the dangers of their
leaders’ decisions. Afier this event, Kennedy extended the agenda of USIA, adding their
responsibility to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives through influencing
public opinion. The USIA became the president’s top organization for measuring other
nations’ attitudes. Murrow explained, “The agency was now the psychological advisor of
the president, and the communication between the White House with foreign nations.”
Executive Order #11034, enacted on June 25, 1962, gave the director of USIA full
power and responsibility to carry out these programs. During Murrow’s time as director,
the USIA would expand its policies to include more Third World nations. In Africa,
where many nations had recently won their independence from European colonizers, the
USIA strove to establish economic, political, psychological, social, and cultural
relationships. As the United States became more involved in Vietnam, the USIA became
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even more valuable to the country’s agenda. Its role in the war was fourfold. First, the
agency established culture and information programs. Second, USIA served as the key
representative to the international press. Then, USIA established direct psychological
warfare against the Vietcong forces, and used counterintelligence against the works and
aims of the Vietnamese Minister of Information. These efforts in Vietnam helped to
involve the USIA in the Cold War effort, to further legitimize it as a useful organization
in foreign affairs. Due to health issues, Murrow would resign in 1964.
Frank Shakespeare, 1969-73
In 1969 Nixon appointed Frank Shakespeare. Under Shakespeare, the USIA
departed from the détente agenda, separating itself from Nixon’s agenda. Shakespeare
was a strong upholder of anticommunist sentiment and displayed strong opposition to the
Soviet Union. Although, his administration was short lived, he had massive influence on
USIA’s overall mission and future goals. The new mission focused more on uprooting
communism. Many USIA officers saw inconsistency under his administration, criticizing
his inability to maintain the goal of presenting accurate news coverage while adopting an
anticommunist agenda.
James Keogh, 1973-1976
In 1973, Nixon appointed James Keogh as the new director of USIA. Keogh
sought to renew the legitimacy and accuracy of the agency, and his commitment to
accurate news coverage did not waiver even during Nixon’s Watergate scandal. During
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this time, VOA covered the entire story to the world in an accurate, informed, and
updated manner. Through this commitment to accuracy, the USIA and the VOA gained a
global reputation as an honest and trustworthy source.
John Reinhardt, 1977-1981
In 1977, Carter appointed a new director, John Reinhardt, along with establishing
a different direction for the organization. He stressed the need for USIA to develop a
program whereby United States could equally learn and understand foreign countries
while teaching them about the American way of life. Carter wanted the agency to inform
other nations of America’s failures and achievements. He wanted the USIA to show
every aspect of democracy to the world in hopes to legitimize and critique American
political and social practices. Carter felt that the United States could possibly gain
information from other nations on how to fix its own democratic inadequacies.
Furthermore, he believed the United States should seek a better understanding of the
aspirations and aims of foreign countries, so that the USIA could better assist them in
their efforts of development and democratization. Carter’s memorandum to Reinhardt
outlined his new mission for USIA. Throughout his term as director Reinhardt would
seek to fulfill Carter’s agenda.
Charles Wick, 1981-1989
Charles Wick was the longest serving director. He was appointed by Reagan in
1981. Under Charles Wick the agency underwent changes as it adjusted to the policies of
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the Reagan administration. Wick expanded the use of VOA and telecommunications as
director. His agenda was primarily anticommunist. He is known for his charisma and
public relations abilities while director. He strove to bolster Reagan’s image
internationally. Wick, however, was obligated by Congress and academics to stress more
educational and cultural programs. Under Wick, the agency’s budget increased
massively. Wick was able to use these funds to modernize VOA and other programs.
Wick envisioned technology as key in spreading public diplomacy and causing change in
areas like Africa.
USIA’s Africa A2enda
Civic and political education became the top priority of the USIA in areas like
Africa. USIA political education taught on subject areas such as constitutions, laws,
public institutions, and electoral processes. Furthermore, it gave instruction on what is
believed to be good citizenship, study on governance and politics, human rights and
intergroup relations, conflict resolution, and the operation of non governance. USIA
sought to explain the process of an independent judiciary as not influenced by a monarch
or the aristocracy, fair electoral systems, and most of all a free and independent media.
Through USIA’s information activities, the United States government’s policies and
operations were explained to the world.
It was common for the USIA to support programs like the American Participant
(AmPart) abroad. This program sent political scientists overseas as lecturers. In addition,
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they would promote discussions of interest among experts in fellow countries. These
dialogues would include conversations about Americans’ developments and focus on
areas such as economics, international politics, and US political and social processes.24
The USIA has gone as far to teach English in many African nations. In Africa, south of
the Sahara, there are over 800 distinct tongues and dialects. It is believed that English
will have a great influence on bridging Africans together despite all the major distinctive
languages that already exist.25
It is interesting to note that USIA’s policies were not focused towards actually
identifying and informing Americans about the diverse cultures that existed in the
continent of Africa. Consequently, throughout the 1 970s Africa wasn’t presented
favorably in the United States media. Prior to 1955 the United States coverage of the
continent was limited to the Henry Stanley breed adventures which focused on wildlife
and some could say exploitation. Following the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez
Canal (1956), Ghana liberation from colonial rule (1957), and the Algerian war (1962),
the continent became of more key concern in American media. During this period the
USIA lacked efforts in spreading African culture around the world and even in the United
24 Bissell, Richard E, Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era, (Somerset, NJ : Transaction
Publisher, 1984) 15-67.
25 Ornstein, Jacob. The ABC~s ofLanguages and Linguistics (West Chester, PA: Chilton Books,
1964)205.
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States. Furthermore, the agency failed to show the commonalities between Africans’
lifestyles and those of American citizens.26
It has been argued that political education can only be influential in foreign
territories if it has first sought to identify with the citizens of these areas. In order for
nations to understand each other’s culture they first have to acknowledge whether the
information learned will cause for greater admiration or contempt. History reveals the
ineffective strategies of the British in India, France in Indochina, and the United States in
Cuba to persuade these nations to adopt similar economic and political structures as
theirs.
The USIA’s abilities to support books that have been written in English but
translated to many foreign languages have served as a powerful means to spread
American ideals and disparagement of current political governments. The spread of
American political education abroad has combined the classrooms of foreign students and
United States intellectuals alike to share in the critique of the era in which they live.
Thus, the agency has largely influenced the intellectual development of many states. The
Americans political ideas and theories spread beyond the country into other parts of the
world among governors and leaders making democratic decisions for their nation. One
must take into account the means of measuring effectiveness of these intellectual
materials, such as books in communist and nondemocratic governments. Let it be noted
that the USIA’s Fulbright program carried with it the same procedure of educating the
26 Segal, Aaron, “Africa Report ,Volume 15, No. Number 5 ,“ Africa Report,(May) 1970: 1-42.
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students in foreign territories of Asia, Africa, India, and Australia; however, it differed in
the wealthier nations of Europe.27
Since countries seek to paint a better image of themselves abroad, in order to
establish mutual understanding with other nations, it is sufficient to examine the two
factors that accommodate these policies: (1) the effort to establish truth and correct
assumed false attitudes or assumptions; (2) efforts that will lead to positive mutual
opinions and strengthening of friendships. Taking these points into consideration, it is
significant that the USIA sought to present the more appealing aspects and positive
information about the United States, and withhold negative aspects that could cause
skepticism towards the nation’s political and economic systems in Africa.28
The USIA strictly held to the opinion that freedom of speech is a part of
American life. The American Studies movement started in the l930s and since then has
strove to combine history, government institutions, literature, art, along with American
culture as a means of defining the United States and its people. A bundled system of
American academia curricula has been established to be utilized within other nation’s
education programs. Although this program has been upheld by the USIA, it has been
difficult to establish in some European universities, and African countries that were
colonized by European nations. This is shown in the case of the university in Munich,
where the American Studies program had a long, hampered history of trying to integrate
27 Spiller,Robert E, Milestones in American Literary History (Contributions in American Studies)”
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977) 77-85.
28 Ibid
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within the German academic system. The program was more successful in Oslo, only due
to its establishing connections with a Norwegian professor who was backed by American
finances and human resources.
Following WWII, American studies became more important globally because of
its recent success and victory in the war. American political and economic structure
became of keen interest to future assumed competitors and partners around the world.
One must understand the different structural and research establishments ofAmerica and
European higher education systems. The key difference is America’s structure is
designed around departments and schools; Europe however bases its system off of chairs
and faculties. It’s interesting to note that Africa’s, Asia’s, and South America’s education
structure has been cemented in with Europe’s, which is a reflection of the consistent
colonization that took place in these areas during imperialism.
It was difficult to spread another Western style education in African nations
which had previously lived through a history of imperialism and colonization. Therefore,
any similar form of cultural curricula to the European style of education encountered
obstacles to influence in an area already familiar with suppressive and discriminative
educational institutions. A noteworthy example of such a conflict would be the activism
of South Africa’s Student Organization (SASO) during the Black Conscious Movement.
During this movement, students protested the use of European language in their studies
and curriculum for more African-centered education. This is the biggest issue that
evolved with the USIA agenda in foreign territory and the spread of political education
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abroad - how to introduce a culture, ideology, or subject into a nation smeared by the
cultural clashes of the past. This can be further examined through the activities of the
VOA.
VOA’s Presence in Africa
News and modern media started its coverage in Africa nearing the early 1950s,
fresh into the Cold War era. The media’s founding purpose was centered on European
religion. Therefore, from its inception, the media became a source whereby colonial
imperialists could spread their messages of domination. As this research on public
diplomacy in Ethiopia shows, once Africa became liberated from colonial rule, many
nations sought to develop themselves completely dependent from Western European
ways and ideas; this same concept of dissimulation led to state-owned and controlled
media outlets. Thus, in many occasions VOA would serve as the only true independent
source of media in Africa. Kenya, Egypt, and Nigeria, however, represent some
exceptions.29
Media itself carried with it so many capabilities that it sometimes caused
unintentional conflict with many fractions within a nation. Having a media outlet allowed
for all points of view to be heard. The news did serve as a political check on
governmental power and corruption during this era. Some scholars argue that the freedom
29 Teshome, B. Wondwosen. Media and multi-party elections in Africa: The Case of Ethiopia.’
International Journal ofHu,’nan Science Vol. 6 Issue I ,(March 2009): 1-30.
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of press has been associated with the democratization process within a country. It has
been proven that free and uncensored media helps to overthrow tyrant governments and
assisted in establishing more liberal democratic establishments. Therefore, the study will
now examine VOA’s activities in the continent.
The Voice of America radio broadcast was utilized throughout Africa and was a
major part of what was believed to be America’s imperialistic domination throughout the
world. However, the Cold War efforts in Africa, although seemingly imperialistic, were
more centered on hindering the advancement of the Soviet Union’s communistic agenda
throughout the global economic system. Although James Burnham argued for an
American empire, the only true way this could ever happen is through the United States
establishing itself as the world hegemony. Burnham’s theories could only be achieved
through the advancement of American cultural, politics, and economic system in foreign
territory.
Voice of America’s presence in Africa served as a similar threat to communism,
as did Christian Children’s Fund and Radio Voice of the Gospel (RVOG). Both these
organizations served as a means to bring American points of view and culture to
Ethiopia. Consequently, the Christian Children Fund came in the form of education by
adopting orphans, which would teach American ideas, opposed to communistic views.
RVOG often came in conflict with the autocratic rule of Haile Selassie and later the
Dergue which heavily censored programming and eventually took it over to form a more
government-supportive broadcast. Thus, because of VOA programming during an era
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that was very hostile towards outside intervention, it was naturally met with some
resistance from African government officials.3°
VOA then had to show itself as a neutral figure in African politics or side with the
oppositional parties as their medium for voicing political views. The situation rising in
Africa was a precarious one, causing VOA to act with prudence, but maintaining its
public diplomacy goals and news accuracy. Radio news broadcasts assisted Africa greatly
in political education due to its high illiteracy rate throughout the continent. For example,
in Namibia alone, 60% of the population was illiterate as late as the 1989 election.
Statistics show that the media in general has always had a major influence on the
outcomes of elections in nations such as Kenya, Congo, Zambia and Ethiopia. In some
circumstances it has been hard for oppositional groups to have a platform in the media.
This is why in Ethiopia; the VOA would become a major source of reliance for the
opposition group to Mengistu’s Derg.3’
30 Walker, William 0,” National Security and Core Values in American Histoiy, “(Cambridge
University Press; 1st ed. 2009), 293-296.
31 Wondwosen, Media and multi-party elections in Africa, 29.
CHAPTER III
VOICE OF AMERICA
VOA Mission and Goals
The VOA broadcast has been recognized as a unique and valuable form of
communication in that it has the capability to instantly transmit information directly from
the sender to the receiver without any alterations in the message. In addition, VOA airs in
areas plagued by a high illiteracy rate and in which it is necessary to gain preapproval of
political figures to have anything broadcasted. Thus, VOA is more accessible and usable
for the average listener in remote Third World nations. Through technology, VOA is able
to maneuver around most obstacles that may hinder the spread of information on the
global economy, democratic representation, and a critique of international government
figures.
VOA has established broadcast bridges among localities, state providences, and
national networks that streams directly to citizens throughout the world. In fact,
conversations have been allowed to occur among foreign citizens and political
educational experts via local broadcasting facilities in these countries. Thus, forums such
as intellectual debates, panel discussions, and government symposiums have occurred via
VOA in nations like Ethiopia. Following such speeches, citizens then will call in,
sparking heated and enthused
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discussions on the subject presented by the broadcast. VOA has stood as the only means
of communication among many foreign nations when all other outlets have been closed
or blocked out. This was the case in Ethiopia when the broadcast and networks were
controlled by Mengistu and the Derg. Radio is standard and profitable in areas lacking
normal access to communication alternatives such as remote places in Africa, South
America, and Asia.
As mentioned before, VOA has been active since 1942. Following, the Second
World War, public diplomacy through radio broadcasting became a key strategy of the
United States in foreign policy. VOA became one of the most utilized United States
government agencies to form the policy outlined in the Truman doctrine. VOA aimed to
broadcast in all areas of the world but specifically in communist nations. It emerged as
the official government radio station and would later be incorporated into the USIA in
1953.32 Thus, USIA, through VOA broadcasting, became the centerpiece for the United
States’ new public diplomacy efforts in the world.
During the time VOA was being established it became of key importance to
maintain similar purposes and goals of the USIA. The VOA maintains a communication
structure for each individual nation. VOA has been described as “the tail that wags the
USIA dog.”33The VOA is the largest sub-agency of the USIA and stands as the longest
32 Rawnsley, Gary D. Radio D~p1omacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International
Politics, ]956-64,(New York, NY: Paigrave Macmillan, 1996) 90.
~ Tuch, Hans N. Communicationg with the World: US. Public Diplomacy Overseas, (N.Y.: St.
Martins Press, 1990) 224.
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operating agency existing under the USIA, as well. During some occasions, VOA served
as the United States’ only communication medium of public diplomacy and political
education to the world.
VOA began broadcasting news daily to over 83 million people worldwide. At the
end of the Cold War the USIA became less necessary in American Foreign policy
initiatives. When President Bill Clinton signed the International Broadcasting Act of
1994, it formed a governing board to supervise all US broadcasting, known as the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). This board would act as the key director of all
major broadcast around the world, including the VOA broadcast. The BBG provided
guidance to the VOA, WORLD NET Television; Film Services, and other shows.
Clinton’s initiative caused the final separation between VOA and USIA. However,
because of its importance to Cold War foreign policy strategy, the VOA’s legacy
remained intact.
VOA in the Cold War Era
VOA broadcasting in Ethiopia can be traced back to the Cold War. There is the
possibility that the organization’s policies were a reflection of the Cold War, US
presidency, USIA, and officers within the agency. One will note that VOA aimed to
maintain the same policies towards every nation. Their main goal, however, was to
present the United States in a positive way to every distinct country.
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One issue that concerned VOA during the Cold War was that the agency often
found itself in a battle for prestige between Radio Moscow and BBC. BBC was never
looked at as an extension of Great Britain’s government. VOA often found itself caught
between the Cold War politics surrounding the two superpowers at the time. The struggle
for hegemony between the United States and Soviet Union caused VOA and Radio
Moscow to be used by both governments to further the geopolitical objectives of each. It
was said at one point that if Radio Moscow broadcasted 2,000 hours per week in 85
languages, then VOA aimed to air longer periods in a greater number of languages.34
Even during the Cold war, it remained important for VOA to report both negative
and positive information on the United States. In addition, VOA aimed to present this
information in a clear and comprehensive matter so that everyday citizens could
understand. VOA used editorials and commentaries which aim to keep balance in
presenting arguments and opinions. In aiming to transmit clear and accurate information,
VOA often employs citizens from different countries where the broadcast is being aired.
These foreign staff members work mainly in the language division and at times have
decided topics, which they themselves presume to be more relevant than others.
VOA language services in the past were known for establishing their own
programming. They often established which approach the broadcast would take in airing
the news. Though the language services could influence how news was presented to the
public, the stories themselves were produced by American journalists. Later, regulations
34Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda, 90-98.
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within the agency granted the editors the authority to modify translations for accuracy.
Those new regulations, however, did not prove completely effective in discouraging staff
members who felt political pressure to keep airing one story over another.
In truth VOA’s mission actually fulfilled the objectives of USIA, which is to
establish reliable information and credible news. However, during the Cold War, as early
as the 195 Os, it was difficult for VOA to avoid the politics surrounding Washington.
VOA was never meant to have any direct dealings with the politics in Washington and
was supposed to have no political influence in its programming from public officials,
bureaucrats, or other actors within government. Later, VOA would gain more
independence and was backed by the policies of Jimmy Carter, along with senators in
Congress. VOA’s now rigid policy for airing news during the 1970s and 198Os started to
gain credibility among its global listening audience. However, since the 1 970s many
foreign officers and officials question whether VOA has been completely independent
from the US government.
During the Cold War, some foreign officials and heads of governments
complained about the airing of VOA news in their countries. This raises several
questions:
1. Did VOA ever intentionally spread criticism of governmental officials to stir political
strife in their countries?
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2. Are these government officials not open to allowing critical critique of their
government forms and despising any news coverage that hasn’t been sanctioned by them?
3. Does VOA strive to keep balance coverage of news, by displaying the same measure
of negative and positive aspects of the United States?
4. Is it that only positive propaganda spreads throughout foreign governments, which
offers no critical analysis of the errors of the officials, causing VOA to air only negative
aspects of those governments in order to help balance out the already excessive idolizing
or misinformation used by political leaders in these nations?
During the I 980s, VOA managers caused some damage to its global reputation by
using harsh and oversimplified editorials. Many foreign officials saw criticisms made
about their government’s policies during VOA broadcast as being influenced by the
United States government. For example, President Mobutu of Zaire believed all
information aired via VOA’s broadcast had been instigated by United States government
officials. Even after the US Ambassador of Zaire tried to assure Mobutu that his
assumption was wrong, there was a lingering doubt in the dictator’s mind as to VOA’s
independence, highlighting issues surrounding how government officials viewed the
radio broadcast during this era.
If VOA was considered by dictators to be subversive, it is a possibility that they
expanded this belief among the citizens. That being said, VOA was never seen by these
autocratic governments as spreading public diplomacy or airing political education to the
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nations. It is known (and will be subsequently discussed in greater detail) that VOA has
suffered from its transmission signals being jammed during the time Mengistu was leader
of Ethiopia and by other governments as well. At times, VOA broadcast served as the
only media source for rebel forces or those who strongly disagreed with these autocratic
governments.
It has been documented that VOA sometimes unintentionally hindered the
diplomatic progress of some African nations. For an example, in Nigeria after the civil
war during the 1 970s, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom was supposed to have
persuaded General Yakaba Gowon at a breakfast meeting to allow an international
commission survey Biafra. The development of an international commission at the time
was a sensitive issue, and if the United States was seen as a part of the mission it was
doomed to failure. VOA got word of the meeting and proceeded to broadcast its
happenings. As soon as it aired, the opportunity for negotiation was destroyed. Although
VOA was simply trying to adhere to its policy of accuracy, the public diplomacy mission
of the organization was hindered by this commitment to airing the latest international
news.
Africa’s Post-Colonial Intellectual Movement
VOA in Africa established media cross-culture communication with the United
States. Through this medium, African information such as news and culture was
presented throughout the world. VOA gave way to public diplomacy during an era when
Africa was rediscovering itself following decolonization. Many of these African nations,
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which sought to liberate themselves from former oppression, began adopting ideas of
modernization. The theory of Modernization extended through Almond and Coleman’s
belief in structural functionalism. This belief held that a similar political system would
maintain the same functions regardless of the cultural differences esteemed in Africa
compared to the Western world.
During this era in Africa’s history, westernization was examined and questioned
by many of the continent’s renowned scholars as well as leaders of the revolutionary
period. VOA helped to further this critique of modernization and brought an alternative
view of potential relevance to the emerging governments on the continent. Therefore, to
better understand VOA activities in Africa during the Cold War, one must examine the
post-colonial intellectual movement that occurred in the continent.
Western theorists presented an idea of African statehood modeled after the United
States and European government structure forms. However, African scholars, activists,
and liberators began to separate themselves from ideas of capitalism and western
modernization to arguing new theories that would shape Africa’s intellectual discourse on
politics. Leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julis Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, and Patrice
Lumumba direct Africa’s future towards new socialistic principles and ideas of
development. These socialistic ideas were to influence the economic, political and social
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practices, which would later serve as a lasting legacy in many nations throughout the
African continent.35
Around the 1950s, African nations began seeking independence from the imperial
and colonial rule of Western nations. During this era, liberal traditionalists, in contrast,
gathered an idealistic opinion of these new formed African nationalist and
revolutionaries. They envisioned an Africa developing itself in a Western model similar
to Japan, Canada, Europe, and the United States. However, during the Cold War era this
kind of transformation was hard to come about in a nation who had formally been
oppressed by Western imperialists. VOA and the USIA sought to assist in spreading
democratic ideas throughout the continent of Africa during this time. These organizations
had to face the same difficulties of presenting America’s social, political, and economic
values in a very hostile situation.
As mentioned, modernization became the key theory for many African
intellectuals early in the 50s through the 60s. Different African nations sought to develop
themselves by using the Western world as their model. These countries measured
progress by the GNP. Measuring by this alone, of course, does not fully examine the
cultural and political changes that were taking place in each individual nation. Max
Weber’s theories were used for a social paradigm for these new liberating nations.
Weber’s theory of industrial capitalism was embodied by newly formed African nations.
~ Walker, William 0., “National Security and Core Values in American History,” (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition, 2009) 197-99.
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These ideas called for African countries to move away from more traditional values such
as ethnic divisions. The USIA through VOA attempted to present an idea of Africa as a
melting pot, as in the United States.
Once more, these modernization techniques encountered resistance from African
natives, who held to strong traditionalist views. During this period VOA was mainly
effective at fulfilling the USIA’s agenda of aiming to seek understanding of other
cultures. VOA began serving as a key outlet of support to governmental oppositional
groups in these new African nations. In addition, urbanization through mass media was
able to help bring about this American modernization socially and politically. VOA
accelerated this modernization process during the beginning of the Cold War, and played
in an extensive role in Ethiopian liberation and transition towards a more democratic
nation. VOA also established a media where political and civic education could be
delivered to the average Ethiopian citizens. The media represented an institution whereby
the modem conceptualized framework of democracy would be explained to the average
citizen.
The theory of modernization would refine itself as the Cold War continued
throughout the 60s until the 70s. One must note that Ethiopia went through major
governmental changes from the autocratic rule of a monarchy to a militaristic regime
controlled by a fascist political party under the notion of liberty and democracy. In fact,
the nation under this despotic rule would come to be named the Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia.
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Very questionable was the argument of how effective a Western model might
function in a Cold War scenario and amidst a backdrop of African traditionalism. This
sparked a strong critique of Almond’s and Coleman’s theory of structural-functionalism.
Through the Cold War phenomenon, the United States often was forced to support
authoritarian African leaders to maintain an anticommunist government in these nations.
Consequently, many delays towards development occurred in these nations throughout
the 60s.
Samuel P. Huntington, a chief theorist of this era in African development, argued
that strong authoritative governments helped to secure stability in these African nations,
even if they happen to be communist regimes. Huntington’s revisionist perspective
argued against the goals of USIA and the use of VOA in many African nations. This
conflict provoked a debate over whether it was better for African nations to aim for
stability or democracy. Questions arose as to whether Africa was a continent that could
not harbor democratic values in its government form. Others examined whether it was the
Cold War and outside influences that hindered many African nations towards achieving a
functional democracy. African leaders would emerge and refine these ideas of
democracy.36
Nyerere’s policies strongly influenced African culture. Today his ideas are still
highly esteemed in Africa among the young hip hop generation in the continent. He
~ Schraeder, Peter J, “African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation, “( Florence, KY:
Wadsworth Publishing Co mc, 2003) 307-310.
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established high appreciation for African traditional values and behavior. The Africa
Nyerere envisioned was a continent that existed well before any outside influence from
Western or Eastern European nations. Although he believed in African traditionalism, it
is important to note, that Nyerere remained open to other cultures abroad. His belief in
learning from diverse cultures gave rise to the current social movement of Hip-Hop
cultural expressions, which are African American art forms that developed in the nation
of Tanzania.37
Although Nyerere remained neutral during the Cold War neither, siding with the
Western or Eastern European powers, it is clear through his writing that he held to strong
socialist views, He established policies of Ujamaa, encouraging the need for extended
families and shared agricultural development in urban territories. One of the hardest
adjustments for most African nations, which conflicted with American political model,
was that the continent was traditionally socialistic.38
Other scholars such as Amilcar Cabral brought a new theory of how Africa must
discover itself in a challenging and changing world. Cabral was a leading African
intellectual during the VOA’s Cold War activities. His scholarship was centered on the
decolonization of Westerners imperialist ideas and constructs. In one of his speeches
Cabral talked about the dilemma of culture resistance. In this analysis, he stated,
~ Lemelle, Sidney J,”The Vinyl Ain’t Final: Hip Hop and the Globalization ofBlack Popular
Culture: Hip Hop and the Globalisation ofBlack Popular Culture,” (London: Pluto Press, 2006) 208-213,
38 Nyerere, Julius.”Freedo,n and Socialism. Uhuru Na UJAM4A: A Selection From Writings and
Speeches, 1965-1967, “(New York, NY: Oxford Univeristy, 1971) 39.
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“Imperialist colonial domination has tried to create theories which, in fact, are only gross
formulations of racism, and which, in practice are translated into permanent state of siege
of the indigenous populations on the basis of racist dictatorship (or democracy).”39
Cabral ‘5 writings addressed the outside domination of Western powers over the
native Africans culture and land. This suppressive control over Africans has not only
been held through despotism, but at times has come in the form of democratic principles
that became nothing more but progressive assimilation.40 According to Cabral, any form
of mass assimilation from native African culture to a Western one creates a
confrontational resistance amongst African nationalist and traditionalist within the newly
liberated nations on the continent. Cabral explains how culture is always intertwined with
every other aspect of society, be it political or economic. Therefore, any cultural
exchange programs consist of obvious fixes on ones political or economic philosophies.
As seen during the modernization period in Africa, democracy and capitalism was
esteemed above all other forms of government, simply because of its usage throughout
the Western world. What philosophers and political intellectuals like Cabral were arguing
for is a more independent scope of society for Africans to reclaim their independent
heritage after colonization.
~ Cabral, Amilcar, “National liberation and culture (Eduardo Mondlane memorial lecture),
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 1970) 39-41.
40 Ibid
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VOA Activities in Ethiopia
During the Soviet-supported communist regime of the DERG, the Voice of
America began broadcasting in Amharic. The first News Director of this phase of the
VOA’s history was Negussie Mengesha, who helped to establish and develop the
Amharic Broadcast in 1982.41 Mengesha became the Director of Amharic Services at
Deutsche Welle until the ousting of the government under Emperor Haile Seleassie fell.
VOA was met with strong resistance, causing friction with the political leaders
and party who held power in the Nation of Ethiopia. To properly understand VOA’s
conflict in airing news coverage in Ethiopia one will need to understand the development
of broadcasting in the country. The media under Selassie started early in the 3 0’s, and he
would go on to establish a Ministry of Information in the country. All media under
Selassie was limited to only printing positive aspects about the government while
censoring anything that would defame the monarchy. This tight control on free press
continued until Selassie’s death. Under Mengistu the media was in control of one military
party that ruled as a fascist regime. The Derg ruled the media with an iron hand. Needless
to say, many journalists were censored and those who attempted to resist these tight
restraints where persecuted42
~ Heil, Alan L, “Voice ofArnerica: a history, “(New York, NY: Columbia University, 2003) 267.
“~ Wondwosen, Media and multi-party elections in Africa, 7-9.
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Ethiopia’s broadcasting was mainly used to counter the imperialist ideology of the
Western colonizers. In 1933, the Italians started the first radio newscast. In 1936 the
Italians used the newscast as a means to help in its domination of Ethiopia when it
occupied the country during 1936. As mentioned Radio Voice of Gospel began airing in
the nation in 1963. Not too long after, during the 1 960s, the country would establish its
own media known as Radio Ethiopia. Up until 1991 under Ethiopia’s People
Revolutionary Democratic Front, the country was never really able to establish an
independent news media that was not influenced in some way by the government. After
1991, the news media flourished in the nation.
Ethiopia’s government sought to help organize the transition from a nation once
under strict media suppression and backwards regression to a thriving communication
age in the country. Under EPRDF a new proclamation was codified into law as a means
for governing broadcast. The proclamation included restrictions on content that could stir
rebellion against the state. As Wondwosen documented:
However, in case of a crime committed against the safety of the state,
administration, the national defense force, or in the case of proceedings of a
serious crime, the court may order the publisher or the editor of the press to
disclose his (her) source of information (Article8(4b)). Moreover, the
proclamation requires that any press product should not give rise to criminal and
civil liability (Article 10); should be free from a criminal offence against the
safety of the state (Article 1 0(2b)4~
Censorship would, however, be abolished in the nation during this government
transition. The freedom of the press proclamation is considered to have opened the door
~ Ibid, 8.
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for private media companies to establish themselves in Ethiopia. In 1994, Ethiopia
adopted a new constitution allowing freedom of speech:
Article 29 of the 1994 Constitution declares that, Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression without any interference. This right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
media of his choice. According to the Constitution, Freedom of the press and
other mass media and freedom of artistic creativity is guaranteed.44
In 1999, Ethiopia would increase this kind of progress through the establishment
of a Broadcasting Agency. Consequently, Ethiopia has recently made revisions to the
Proclamation which some have noted to hinder the freedom of the press. Ethiopia has a
long history struggling with the content and freedom of media as it has evolved towards
democratic forms of government.
“i Ibid
CHAPTER IV
ETHIOPIA IN THE COLD WAR ERA
Brief Historic Overview
Although the research focuses on the timeframe steaming from 1971-1991, it is
necessary to briefly review the periods prior to Selassie’s decline and Mengistu’s rise to
power in order to fully understand the aforementioned time period. Ethiopia has a rich
history of more than three thousand years. Both Emperor’s Menelik II and Haile’
Selassie, helped the nation move towards modernization. Menelik helped Ethiopia
develop into a strong independent nation, while Selassie moved the country towards a
western model structure. During his time as emperor, Haile’ Selassie was often affected
by the impact of European colonization and imperialism. Many European nations sought
to conquer Ethiopia.4~ A noteworthy example of Selassie’s constant battle with European
nations was the Wal Wal incident, which would lead to the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.
This major conflict occurred just four years after Selassie had been crowned emperor.
Needless to say, Ethiopia’s plight in the world has often been influenced by other
world events, such as World War II and the Cold War. In World War II Ethiopia regained
its independence through a collaboration of European and African liberating forces. After




regaining power, Haile’ Selassie then sought to reform the nation, and it is from here that
we will review specific changes made in education and the diplomatic partnership
developed with the United States.46
Education in Ethiopia
The education in Ethiopia has been largely influenced by the political situation in
the country. From 1900-1974 the illiteracy rate of Ethiopia was 90%. Those who were
granted an opportunity for education found it in strict religious traditionalism. The
Italians reorganized the educational system in 1936 as they sought to establish schools for
their newly colonized subjects. These schools were seen as nothing more than
propaganda institutions used to assimilate Ethiopians into Western culture.47 Although
Ethiopian School Ecole Imperiale Menelik II housed western education in the country
prior to any outside European nation, there was still strong resistance to these methods of
assimilation.
Drastic changes in the educational system were implemented following the
Italians’ defeat. Salassie built more schools on the primary, secondary and college levels.
Amharic was the main language taught to the students. Ethiopia had to rely mainly on
foreign instructors because of the massive shortage of teachers. During the 1950s,
enrollment increased at the public primary, secondary, and college level. There were only
46 Ibid,265-266.
“i Pankhurst, Richard. ‘Education in Ethiopia during the Italian Fascist Occupation ,“
International Journal ofAfrican Historical Studies, 5, (May, 1972): 371.
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two schools of higher education formed in the 1 950s, Addis Ababa University and the
University of Asmara, a private Catholic school.
The Amharic language was the dominant language used in primary schools. This
isolated many students who communicated in another tongue. In addition, the mass
population of people who did not speak Amharic were limited to minor access to political
information about their government. The VOA, however, aired in more than one
language to help mend this gap. The VOA airing in diverse languages helped the people
who were isolated or didn’t understand Amharic stay informed on their nations’ policies
and agenda. VOA remained highly influential in Ethiopia because of its ability to fulfill
an educational gap that was lacking in the country.48
Student Movement and Protest
Selassie’s leadership saw mass conflicts and debates over the education offered to
the populace. Selassie himself became a strong ally of Western nations and their model of
living. During this time in the 1960’s, however, the intelligentsia and students of the
nation began to break ties with Selassie’s aristocratic policies and started to sympathize
more with the poor and commoners of the country. Selassie’s governance was
characterized by mass inconsistency. On the global stage he found himself partnering
with colonizing Western European nations, while at the same time protesting for the
48 Damtew Teferra, Philip G. Aitbach, African Higher Education: An International Referebce
Handbook (Indian: Indiana University Press, 2003) 316-325.
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liberty of African countries and advocating for pan-Africanism. Within his own nation,
Selassie attempted reform by limiting the influence of the aristocrats and passed laws that
improved equality for all citizens. These domestic changes in policy caused mass anger to
rise toward his administration.
The intelligentsia in the nation began to advocate strong Marxist views that
opposed Western ideology in its entirety. Selassie found himself at war with his own
nation’s transitioning ideas, which were moving passed theories of Western cooperation
to more radical views of land reform and revolution49Ethiopia started to be greatly
influenced during the late 1960s into 1970’s by the Cold war struggle of democratization,
socialism, and capitalist sentiment taking place the world. These ideological conflicts
gave rise to the overthrow of Selassie and allowed Mengistu the opportunity to lead the
country.
The student movement that emerged as a key threat to Selassie emerged from the
masses of people desiring long-needed reform in Ethiopia. Students in the country began
to oppose the imperial system in every possible way and began aiming for a more
classless socialistic structure. At the time, Ethiopia’s intelligentsia was still limited in
number; this, however, did not stop the students from being effective in changing the
government’s policies. When Mengistu made his first attempt in the 1 960s to overthrow
Selassie, he sought the students’ support. Consequently, only about 20% of the student
~ Zewde, Bahru, A History ofModern Ethiopia Second Edition, (Oxford: James Currey, 2001)
220-26.
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movement was in support of the Mengistu’s coup. Mengistu claimed to offer more
opportunity for freedom of speech and the press, as well as a new multiparty
representative system. The account of this first coup explains how effective political
education was in the nation in influencing current events. Although the country remained
low in college enrollment, it still showed the effectiveness minor political education had
on Ethiopia’s government and society.
This excerpt from UCLA research institute helps to highlight the social and
political influence that the student movement had on the revolution:
Zewde said that students played key political roles both before and after the
revolution, when they became the main source of ideas, generally Marxist, for
new avenues and institutions. There were also student militants, but the
movement did not suffer its first fatality in a confrontation with the government
until 1969. Because access to political texts was much better on the outside,
Ethiopian students in Europe and the United States contributed mightily “on the
theoretical side,Zewde said. At the same time, African scholarship students from
Kenya, Uganda, and as far as Nigeria shared their experiences in political
organization and sometimes became leaders in the universities of Addis Ababa,
the capital. The emperor initiated the African scholarships program in 1958, with
some unintended consequences5°
Therefore, Ethiopian citizens began inquiring about freedom and democracy
through academic training and education. What little education the country had during
this time still gave rise to ideas of freedom and governmental change. Consequently, the
change that came from academia was fused with strong Marxist ideals and sentiment.
This Marxist sentiment may have been a reflection of the strong the antigovernment
50 Matthews, Kevin. UCLA African Studies, 04 04, 2006,
http://www.international.ucla.edu/africalarticleasp?parentid=42059 (accessed 07 21, 2010).
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fervor that existed in the nation during Selassie’s leadership, causing Ethiopians to be at
odds with anything supported by the state, including western ideas of modernization.51
The major protest that started the student movement dealt with land reform in the
nation. This was primarily an attempt to establish property ownership for the poor and
impoverished, in accord with socialistic principles. Selassie had integrated western
capitalism with a feudal landlord system. At the time, the aristocracy had power to
plunder land and exploit the peasantry. There was a great land divide in the nation under
Selassie, and his newfound interest in capitalism helped spawn ideas of land reform. This
stirred resentment among the masses to the Western modernization model and capitalistic
ideas.
Apart from extreme inequality with respect to property ownership, there were
extreme levels of disorganization among labor unions and activist groups. There was only
one union permitted in one company. This caused a “tiny and divided proletariat that
could be controlled easily and the vast majority of the peasantry would be disorganized at
a low level of political consciousness.” Once more, the situation throughout Ethiopia
called for the need of wide political educational outlets, which could inform the people
on possible methods to secure greater access to free press and open critique of the
government.52
~ Ibid.
52 Darch, Cohn, The Ethiopian Student Movement in the Struggle against Imperialism, 1960-1974.
12 20, 1976, http;//wvw.physjcs.ncatedu,Lmjchaeh/AAUNe~,ork/flew5/feature/esmhtmI (accessed 06 16,
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During the 1950’s and 1960’s education was of little concern amongst the elites in
Ethiopia. Most elites had risen to power through the court system, which leaned heavily
on military bravery and family ties. The political elites held to strong traditionalist values,
which often placed them in conflict with the intelligentsia who were starting to seek new
forms of government and social practices. The foundation of this disagreement was that
the elites held to capitalistic principles that led them to confiscate the poor landowners’
property while the intelligentsia opposed such economic exploitation on the peasantry.
Consequently, the intelligentsia that was vehemently arguing against economic
exploitation of the peasantry also had been used by the government to ffirther western
modernization in Ethiopia. The Table 1. shows enrollment decreasing as the nation
moves towards revolution, and socio~economic change (see Table 1 below.)
TABLE I: ENROLLMENT
INCREASES BY SECTOR IN
THE FIRST, SECOND AND





Primary Secondary Post Secondary
1955/56—1960/61 72.7 194.0 233.0
1961/62—1966/67 87.5 69.6
222.0
1967/68—1972/73 64.5 129.0 100.
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Table I Source: (Darch, The Ethiopian Student Movement in the Struggle against
Imperialism, 1960-1974, 1976)
The intelligentsia’s funding during this time was primarily used to assist in this
form of economic exploitation. One should note that during this time, “in Ethiopia this
kind of politics was virtually unknown there were no parties, no rallies, and no public
discussions? And even the tame parliamentary debates were held in camera, with no
published record. The political activities of high school and university students thus
challenged the regime on at least three levels”53
Before the student movement, there was no real forum for political debate or even
political education in the form of public diplomacy. While Ethiopia’s intelligentsia
intensely debated which strategy would be more effective, the nation found itself in an
ideological dispute between the two major superpowers, USA and USSR. This is the
political situation VOA had to address while keeping its standard for honest and unbiased
news.
Most schools in Ethiopia were poor in quality, but did harbor two extreme aspects
that made them more effective than the average western secondary intuitions. Firstly, the
schools were housed in major towns, thus receiving all the benefits from being in the very
place where political and government debates were taking place. In addition, the
students’ ages reigned from older teenagers to 26. These were young mature adults more
than capable of defending their political stance against the government whether
academically or through military action. These mature students were able to transcend
~ Ibid.
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what little influence they had to affect government decisions in a major way. The student
council was able to organize each individual school and develop a national governing
board and hierarchy. With this newly founded organization structure came a strong
oppositional group which could critically examine the Selassie administration.
The students used a mock protest that was focused on the socio-cultural wars
among fellow classmates. Eggs were thrown at models for wearing the new popularized
mini-skirts. This staged massive protest caused the army to be sent in and bring order to
the riot. During this sequence of events, the United States Information Service building
was stoned and cars were overturned in the street. Selassie was forced to make a
statement concerning this riot and open up discussions on how the country was being
operated under his administration. This decision gave way to allow more intellectual
critique and political dialogue. Moreover, Selassie’s regime failed to ever accept the
student’s arguments as relevant and build some collaboration with these groups. Instead,
he gave recognition to more violent and sometimes militant groups that were organized to
overthrow his regime. One of the groups in fact was DERG. Table 2 below shows the
public’s response when placed under oppressed regimes and made aware of the political
situation facing the country.
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Outcomes
Access to Mass Political Political Oppression Revolution
Information
VOA Public Diplomacy Political Oppression Revolution
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Educated Masses Political Oppression Revolution
Table 2. Historical outcomes during Mengistu reign by the mass population.
Although the student movement was characterized leftist sentiment, it was noted
as the largest democratic movement that had occurred in Ethiopia after World War IL
The students’ protest brought worldwide attention to Ethiopia’s ills and injustices.
Selassie’s reaction to the student movement was to have Addis Ababa University to enact
Title V of the Faculty Council Regulations 1970, which restricted the student unions and
controlled student publications. The movement helped students to articulate the first
critique of government policies and ideas of reform. Selassie’s regime dismissed the
majority of the events as the work of foreign agitators and “academically marginal”
students. In reality, the students were enabling a political major shift in the nation. What
became a major concern was if the students and intelligentsia had any outside influence
by Soviet operatives. What is known is that many students within the movement
sympathize greatly with Marxist views of government, and saw it as an alternative
position to Selassie who favored the Western world’s model.
Though Mengistu’s regime sought allegiance with the student movement, many
of those involved in the struggle would eventually distrust and be at odds with his
administration as well. When Mengistu did come to power, the army was seen as taking
over the nation and creating an anti-education campaign similar to the one under
Sallessie. This quote explains the students’ view of the incoming regime under Mengistu
in i974: “The aim of the army is to disorganize the progressive elements by scattering
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them about. Once the students are scattered and disorganized, they cannot oppose the
military government”54
Marxist-Leninist Government Under Mengistu
The political situation in Ethiopia was a reflection of the global effects brought on
by the Cold War and mirrored socialist movements occurring all over the world. The
intelligentsia sought to find more democratic processes in the nation that would lead to
greater equality amongst the commoners. Due to the campaign for improved social well
being, political groups such as DERG were able to capitalize on the protest and
movement towards change in the nation. As DERG developed more into a political force,
it was apparent that Mengistu’s main objective was to form a fascist regime, with strong
nationalist sentiment. DERG formed nothing short of a military regime in the nation.
Therefore, the protest and rebellion which is supposed to have sparked ideas of freedom
and equality throughout the nation, morphed into a suppressive government that
disallowed free thought and became anti-educational and oppressive. In such a political
situation, outside objective voices allowed an outlet to suppress political groups and
ideas. The United States Information Agency started to take interest in the political affairs
of Ethiopia during this era. Without any regard they took note of the Soviet’s previous
influence and interaction in the educational affairs of the nation. Thus, Voice of America
~ UNRefugee Agency, Dec. 28, 1999,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworldlcountry,USCIS,,ETH,,3ae6a6b4 14,0.html (accessed Sept. 11, 2010).
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coverage of the political situation served to help those oppressed and censored populace
have an outlet of expression under Mengistu reign of terror.
Following the famine of 1972 -74 in the Wollo region, Selassie’s popularity
began to shrink more than ever. What is interesting to note about Mengistu’s coup is that
Ethiopians had long awaited a revolution that would overthrow Selassie’s monarchy.
However, when the revolution did come, it occurred in the midst of Marxist sentiment
and a global Cold War scenario. Mengistu’s rise to power could be attributed to
Selassie’s inability to resolve social and economic ills that occurred throughout the
country. He was totally detached from the mass population and the issues surrounding
their lives. The overthrow followed a great amount of protest and demonstrations against
the regime, with the student movement merely one among many. As soon as the DERG
came to power, they abolished parliament. The overthrow was noted to have started out
peacefully, embracing sentiments of the early student movement; however, it would later
morph into a violent massacre. Mengistu took power and ordered the arrest as well as
murder of government officials. Although the intelligentsia was noted to agree with the
allegations against most imprisoned officials, they felt Mengistu’s tactics were extreme.55
Mengistu would emerge as leader of DERO by killing off most of his rivals to
leadership. In doing so, he established a newly brutal regime with less democratic
reformation and real social or economic empowerment for the peasantry as well as
~ Ibid
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commoners. The nation would break off into many ethnic splinter groups, which
protested against the autocratic establishment being put in place by Mengistu.
Here is where the USIA and its policies of public diplomacy became even more of
a necessity in Ethiopia. The country was on the verge of trying to figure out the best
possible form of governance and political practice for the nation. Mengistu made sure
there were very few media outlets in the country in order to ensure dominance over the
masses. Therefore, VOA offered additional information that was not previously made
available under Mengistu’s rule.56
Mengistu’s regime viewed young and educated Ethiopians as being linked to the
counterrevolution. Suspected opponents to his regime were executed, which caused a
greater rift with the intelligentsia and other Ethiopian grassroots organizations. There
were two major oppositional groups that emerged during this era, EPRP (Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Party) and MEISON (All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement). The
latter group, MEISON, would support Mengistu’s claim to power; however, EPRP would
remain a key opposition to his establishment. EPRP disagreed strongly with the structure
in which the nation was heading under DERG and derided them as nothing more than a
fascist organization. They would unleash a guerilla campaign aimed at killing DERG
leaders and officials known as the “White Terror.”57
56 Ibid
~ Human Rights Watch,”Ethiopia: Reckoning Under the Law,” Vol. 6, No. 11. (December, 1994),
15-16.
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Mengistu would later react to this opposition by releasing what he called the “Red
Terror” in 1977. During the Red Terror the intelligentsia and education sector were
placed under physical attack and tight censorship by the government. These terms, White
Terror and Red Terror, were historically used to specifically identify groups that sided
with the two major ideological differences later argued during the Cold War era. In
countries like Bulgaria, China, Finland, Germany, Russia, and Hungary, there were
White Terror organizations that fought against communist regimes. Red Terror would be
noted as mass military and sometimes anti-educational, as well as propaganda campaigns
to suppress anticommunist reaction and encourage spread of the ideology. Many terrorist
tactics and methods of intimidation were practiced to scare political opponents during the
Red Terror.
By 1977, the EPRP was no longer in existence.~’8 Later Mengistu would turn on
MEISON members, as well as others who had partnered with his coup and overthrow of
the former regime. It is noted that during just one week in 1978, Mengistu had 5,000 high
school and university students murdered. In addition, over 30,000 students were
imprisoned. Many other attacks were carried out against other advocates who protested
against Selassie’s administration. Mengistu begin to guard against all possible threats of
58 Mayfield, Julie, “The Prosecution of War Crimes and Respect for Human Rights: Ethiopia’s
Balancing Act,” Emory International Law Review (Vol. 9, No.2, 1995): 553.
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rebellion or revolt against his regime59 All these concurrent events brought about the
Ethiopian Civil War that plunged the country in ongoing war, from 1974-1991 ~60
Consequently, the fact that EPRP and MEISON were both Marxist-socialist
sympathizers with minor differences between the two shows that there existed a previous
influx of Soviet political education separated from the oppositional groups, which started
in the 40s, and had already influenced the ideological construct of the academic sector in
Ethiopia. One will examine to what extent USSR influenced the nation towards
communist policies and agendas.
Within this combative situation was the establishment of many sector political
groups. Opponents of DERG were diverse in their ideologies and regions of the country.
In fact, some were organized around their ethnic identity, as well as, political ideology.
Some of these political groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front and Eritrean People
Liberation Front were ethnic movements that sought full succession from the nation
during the Cold War. The other major groups that controlled certain regions of the
country were the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and the Tigrayan
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Eventually, after the heightened starvation campaigns
caused by the military fighting, the civil war began to wind down. TPLF lead a combined
~ Waal, Alexander De, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (Africa Watch
Repori~),(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 111.
60 Christopher, Andrew, and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the
Battlefor the Third World. (New York: Basic Books, 2005)239.
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coalition of forces to overthrow Mengistu and the DERG regime. This new coalition of
Ethiopians led by TPLF became known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF). They would eventually overthrow Mengistu, who fled to
Zimbabwe under political asylum.
Many opponents of DERG sought VOA out as an outlet to express their opinion
of how the nation was being handled under Mengistu, allowing many political isolated
groups the opportunity to present their perspectives to everyday listeners. VOA allowed
unbiased coverage of not only the political situation but also information on the economic
and ecological crisis Ethiopia endured during this era. Mengistu often admitted the airing
of any negative information on the nation of Ethiopia including famines, and mass levels
of oppression placed on citizens under his administration. VOA filled this void of
deciphering false messages presented not to Ethiopians alone, but the world, as to the
political, economical, and social events that were occurring in the country.
USIA constantly tried to counteract the Soviet ideology that had previously
helped to lure many students and young people who sought reform. It sought to balance
out political ideas through methods of covert operations, which promoted the spread of
alternative views in Ethiopia, beyond the dominant Soviets concepts of government. The
geo-political situation of Ethiopia made it critically important in the ongoing Cold War
conflict between the two superpowers.
However, one must ask why VOA and the USIA waited to take such an interest in
the nation after Selassie. It is argued that Selassie aimed to establish the same militancy
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campaign as Mengistu and succeeded by establishing the fourth largest army in the
continent of Africa. In addition, Selassie had a strong disregard for those suffering from
famine and many oppressed groups as Mengistu. What is, however, different from the
Mengistu regime and that of Selassie, is that under the emperor’s administration, a strong
relationship was established with western nations and ideas of modernization were
adopted in the country as a future goal towards development.
Soviet Union Public Diplomacy in Ethiopia
It’s fair to say that the Soviet Union’s political education programs had already
existed in the nation before the Cold War and the events surrounding it. Following the
fall of the Bolsheviks, many Soviet emigrants came to the nation and formed strong
relationships with the Ethiopian government. Alexander Mikhailovich, Grand Duke of
Russia had visited Ethiopia in 1925 as a guest of Haile Selassie. Ethiopia became of key
significance for the Soviets. “For the Russians, Ethiopia’s political importance was clear:
to create an empire as a bulwark against Egypt and the unification of the British colonies
in Africa.”6’ One must note that Ethiopians however, became specifically aware of
Bolshevist propaganda schemes and were not open to these outside influences. Their
response to covert propaganda operatives was to have them expelled from the country.
6~ Wilson, Edward Thomas, Russia and BlackAfrica Before World War IL(New York: Holmes &
Meier, 1974) 93-96.
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This method of expelling instigators was to serve as a scare tactic against other
such interference in the nation. Russia claimed that those spreading propaganda were
only “meddling vagabonds” who were attempting to cause trouble in the nation of
Ethiopia, after being ousted from their own country. It has been documented that Ethiopia
has become more alert and aware of foreign nations attempts to use propaganda within
the country. Ethiopia’s strong religious zeal and commitment to feudalism during the
1 920s made it immune to such propaganda. Once more propaganda and even political
education proves to be ineffective in a nation with strong historical roots, unless it comes
in a method that is sensitive to these realities prior to making an appeal.
Although, Russian Boishevists spies had failed at attempts to secure strong
influence during the 1920s, this did not stop some levels of progress in the next decade.
When Selassie became emperor in 1930, his administration was concerned with a
possible communist agenda to infiltrate and influence the nation’s policies. Selassie was
primarily pro-western throughout his reign; however, this did not completely shield the
administration from communist influence. Allegations flared about a prominent political
figure in Ethiopia who helped chart its constitutional monarchy in 1931. Bajerond Takie
Hawaryat, was believed to have been a leading communist during this time. The Soviets
strove to maintain strong diplomatic relations with Ethiopia even during its war with its
European counterpart, Italy in 1936. The Soviet Union’s constant attempts at diplomacy
and business ventures in the nation gave way to a strong communist agenda after Selassie
was later overthrown. Following the coup Ethiopia transitioned to a different form of
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government, while refining its communist views and ideology as it entered into the Civil
War.62
United States’ Interest in Ethiopia
The United States began to examine the Soviet Union’s activities in Third World
nations during the Cold War Era. In doing so, the United States realized a massive void
that existed between the Soviets and African officials.63 This rift between Soviets and
Africans was caused by imperialistic racial perceptions that Africans were incapable of
being productive as leaders. The African soldiers were said to have resented the Soviets
for trying to impose their culture and customs, implying that it was superior to theirs. The
primary reason that the Soviets were able to build strong partnerships with African
nations was because of their military support. However, as time proceeded, the great
cultural gap persisted and acted as a major hindrance to Soviet-African relations.
Ethiopia was an emerging threat to the Soviet Union and the United States
because of the potential that it could organize other Third World countries to align with
them. In fact, the US government began focusing more attention on Castro and the
Soviets’ involvement throughout the whole continent of Africa. The United States started
to recognize that the Soviets focused their attention on nations, which might be on the
verge of national liberation through revolution or reform. Ethiopia started to gain an
62 Christopher, and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 238-3 9
63 CIA, Soviet Foreign Military Assistance,” C’entral Intelligence Agency, September 12, 2009.
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/D0C0000802746!D0C0000802746.pdf (accessed July 9, 2009).
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increase in international attention during Mengistu leadership due to its constant warfare,
droughts, famine and revolution. The United States regarded Ethiopia as highly unstable.
They also recognized that neither Mengistu nor the insurgent oppositional groups had the
military capacity to overthrow one another without Soviet military support.
The United States government recognized that the Mengistu Marist-Leninist
government would eventually be overthrown. When this eventually occurred, the US
government aimed to see a new regime that would support more Western economic ideas.
The US started seeking a diplomatic strategy to push this westernized agenda forward in
Ethiopia and mitigated the Soviet influence through economic support. Public diplomacy
became a key strategy to US policy in Ethiopia. The US did not seek to support Ethiopia
in any military endeavors. Thus, there was always the possibility that the nation would
once again seek the Soviet Union military support after it gained independence from
Mengistu.
Although Ethiopia relied heavily on the Soviet Union to assist in its military
campaigns in Somalia and Eritrea, the country still held strong ties with the United States
during the Cold War. The Soviets established a strong commitment to gain support from
Ethiopian soldiers and transform them into an effective arm of their military operations.
They sought academic, political and military training for these Ethiopian cadets.
Consequently, records show that U.S. patronage had more of a lasting effect on Ethiopia.
In fact, Ethiopia sought more than just military aid, but was in great need of economic
support as well. The United States aimed to meet the overall needs of the nation and
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spotted this concern faster than its Soviet counterparts. The USIA agenda and VOA
harbored initiatives in the nation foreseen in American foreign policy as a useful tool to
gain Ethiopia as a strong ally to the United States.64
During the Soviet-supported communist regime of the DERG, the Voice of
America began broadcasting in Amharic. The first News Director of this phase of the
VOA’s history was Negussie Mengesha, who helped to establish and develop the
Amharic Broadcast in 1982.65
United States Counterintelligence in Ethiopia
Although it was true that America offered greater aid than the Soviets in Ethiopia,
Mengistu was very selective in airing this support to the public. In addition, Mengistu
enacted blockades of US food and supplies from civilians in order to use all the goods for
his military. Thus, VOA became more adamant about broadcasting US support and aid to
Ethiopia.
CIA records reveals the extensive efforts taken by the Soviet Union to promote
negative propaganda about the United States in Africa, in the form of news articles,
political cartoons, and radio broadcasting. Their aim was to present America as neo
colonialist. The Soviets often presented the theme of post-colonialism when dealing with
Africa leaders and nations. Their unique relationship with Africa was mainly based on the
geopolitical interest in the country. Their main influence as noted was in the sales of
64 Ibid
65 Heil, Voice ofAmerica: a history, 267.
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military armaments and assistances to African leaders. The Soviets primarily supported
the efforts of Mengistu to undermine Sudan and Somalia as a counter strategy to US
efforts in Ethiopia. Ethiopia became a more important ally to the Soviets after they lost
their base in Berbera, Somalia.66
The United States sought to form strong allegiances with Third World countries
that modeled their economies after the industrialized Western world. They aimed to make
it more difficult for the Soviets to persuade Third World nations to become future
partners. The Soviets mainly leaned heavenly on the sales of military equipment to
influence and build alliances with Third World nations. The United States, consequently,
did not have the same liberty to offer large amount of military support in the Third
World. Congress became more reluctant to engage in any direct military action in foreign
policy after the Vietnam War. This hesitation, however, did not hinder the United States
from capitalizing on opportunities to build a stronger relationship with Third World
countries. Therefore, the United States sought other means to influence Third World
Nations, as did the Soviet Union.
The basic US strategy, although aimed to be diplomatic in nature, had also the
potential of becoming more militarily aggressive. The US followed a policy of copying or
countering everything their Soviet counterparts were doing in Africa. This quote reveals
66 CIA, ‘The Soviet Challenge to U.S. Security Interest (NIE 11/4-82,” Central Intelligence
Agency, August 12, 200,. http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC 0000268223/DOC 0000268223 .pdf
(accessed October 13, 2009).
77
the United States’ intentions during their covert operations to influence the Horn of
Africa at all cost:
The United States is also seen as moving to enhance the global mobility and
flexibility of its general purpose forces-a development which the Chief of the
Soviet General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, has labeled as evidence of a US intention
to achieve a global conventional war capability, based on an ability to control
geographical escalation of any future conflict with the USSR. Such Soviet
statements, notwithstanding their self-evident propaganda intent, highlight Soviet
concerns about the direction of US military programs, and the corresponding
perception that US military options will be enhance during the mid-to-late
1980s.67
The United States would in fact later engage in more military operations that would help
bring an end to the Cold War by US covert sales to Afghanistan guerilla fighters against
the Soviets.
The Soviets sought to use proxy and intermediaries in covert operations in
Ethiopia towards regimes that favored their political philosophical agenda, as they did
with Mengistu and the DERG. This quote explains Soviet operations in Ethiopia:
in several Third World states, the proxy relationship applies most directly to joint
ventures in Angola and Ethiopia. In both these countries, the Soviets supply most
of the weapons, material, and logistic support for Cuban combat forces. The
Soviets transported the Cuban intervention forces into Angola and Ethiopia and
Moscow itself maintains over 1,000 military advisers in each of these states. For
the Soviets, the proxy relationship minimizes the level of direct Soviet
involvement while achieving the Soviet aims and projecting the image of socialist




The United States recognized the Soviets use of what was known as “active measures” in
persuading national leaders to favor communism over western agendas. These pseudo
and covert activities became the Soviets’ main exercise of diplomacy in these African
nations during the Cold War. The CIA considers such measures to be propaganda, but in
part it is public diplomacy as used by the US:
Active measures are in large part designed to complement Soviet diplomatic
overtures and initiatives. The common thread that runs through all active
measures is a high degree of manipulation and misrepresentation, either to
disguise Soviet involvement or to conceal the real purpose behind an activity in
which a Soviet citizen is overtly involved. Such activities range from the anti
neutron-bomb campaign to forgeries seeking to embarrass the US and Western
governments; from the manipulation of front groups such as the World Peace
Council to the operation of the clandestine radio stations such as the National
Voice of Iran. 69
The United States recognized that the military domination in Ethiopia brought on
by Mengistu’s regime kept the nation from moving toward more western-friendly
sentiment, as opposed to the socialist views being perpetrated by Mengistu’s regime. It
was noted that without the backing of the Soviets, Mengistu and other autocratic regimes
like his would easily have given way to a more Western style of government. Mengistu
relied heavily on the Soviet military aid during the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, for
example. The CIA noted that Mengistu government could be overturned by ethnic
insurgences. This information brought about a shift in US strategy focused on relying on
69 Ibid
79
other means of counteracting Soviet influence. In retrospect, the United States used
public diplomacy through VOA to inform ethnic oppositional groups. The VOA
broadcast became an effect tool of diplomacy during this era in Ethiopia history. VOA
was used as a means to help bridge people together who held strong sentiment to
overthrowing the repressive regime of Mengistu and the Derg. In addition, VOA stood as
an outlet to inform the world of the inhumane atrocities being carried out by the Derg on
the Ethiopian people. These efforts of VOA helped to solicit more aid from foreign
philanthropies and develop moral support towards efforts of liberation.
Ethnic Opposition Groups to Mengistu
Ethiopia has always been an ethnically diverse nation. This rich diversity would
help organize regimes that would later help overthrow Mengistu. It is important to note
the divisions that developed among Ethiopia’s ethnic groups. When Selassie became
ruler, he dismantled Menelik’s federalism and awarded local autonomy to southern
kingdoms, in return for tribute. Selassie established a policy of centralization and culture
assimilation in Ethiopia. Consequently, when the Eritrean, Tigrean, and Oromo fighters
finally defeated the Derg in 1991, they destroyed the social paradigm that established
culture domination and political exclusion set by Selassie.
In July 1975, the Derg issued Proclamation No. 47, which established kebeles, or
urban dwellers’ associations, in Addis Ababa and five other urban centers. The Derg used
this as a method to stay informed and maintain tight control on every local community.
The kebeles had supervision over most of Ethiopians life during this period.
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In urban areas, kebeles were responsible for rent collection, judicial tribunals, and
a range of social services ‘under government supervision’. Their powers were also
soon extended to encompass registration of houses, residents, births, deaths and
marriages, and the collection of local taxes, whilst the public safety committee
was empowered to ‘carry on guarding and security activities in accordance with
directives issues by the Ministry of Interior’ [Proclamation 9 October 1976].
(ibid.:132)7°
Many people considered the DERG to be nothing less than an ethnic Oromo
organization up until 1977. The Derg had high level officials, such as, Teferi Banti and
significant other Oromos in ranking positions of the organization. Consequently, the
DERG agenda would center on abolishing all traditional ethnic customs which may have
“hampered the unity and progress of Ethiopia.” Thus, they sought to reorganize property
ownership and neutralize the influence of the Orthodox Church by recognizing Islam.
Mengistu’s goals transitioned into nothing short of extremist nationalism and fascism.
DERG policy and propaganda made it extremely difficult for any ethnic opposition
groups to emerge. The DERG aimed to establish complete political autonomy. They
sought to develop this unity in all regions and levels of administration even to localities.
The DERG appointed chief administrators from these diverse ethnic areas to govern the
regions. At times the chief administrators found grave difficulty trying to develop
DERG’s agenda with the growing opposition that steamed from localities.71
Because of the country’s vast diversity, the simplest way used to classify each
group and individual was through language. This was the difficulty Mengistu
~° Vaughan, Sarah, ~Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia,” Review ofAfrican Political
Economy, (September, 2004): 148.
~ Ibid
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encountered when simply trying to census the nation’s population. Since only thirty of
Ethiopia’s “weredas” could be considered monolingual, eventually the government
abandoned language as a method of identification, Mengistu would then start using
economic-classism to categorize the populace. The DERG would caused land reform and
divide throughout the nation. The resettling and “villagising” of rural populations caused
ethnic integration to occur. Ethnic groups with large representation were placed within
the borders of a single administrative unit. These boundary shifts completely overlooked
the new constitutional provision for ethnic territories, causing a new rise of resistance and
resentment among the masses. After causing such drastic change in Ethiopia DERG did
nothing to calm the raging anger among Eritrea and other opposition movements
including TPLF. 72
Tigray (TLPF)
The Tigray people who later helped to form TLPF history started when this
providence was forced to become a part of Ethiopia. Tigrayans had a historical hatred and
suspicion of Amharas due to its repeated battles between different centers of power. The
hatred between these groups was shared amongst both the ruling elite and commoners as
well. This hatred was subsequently transformed into an ideological theme dispersed
amongst Tigrayan youth, students, and the intelligentsia. It is a very controversial debate
as to how effective these beliefs and their political interpretation were throughout the
72 Ibid
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Tigrayan society. There is significant evidence that shows how these ideas helped to
mobilize the Tigray nationalists and boost morale amongst the opposition.
The Tigrayan people boasted of having a lasting legacy of ancient Ethiopian
culture. They dwelled in the area which is composed of the Aksumite Empire, and they
speak a language which is a close derivative of Geez. The Tigrayan providence
established national pride based on these historic links to past Ethiopian society. The
population strictly see themselves as the purest ethnic group, one which preserves
Ethiopia’s original culture. In addition, the Tigrayan people and the TPLF focused on the
centrality of the church as a link between ancient Axum and the modem Ethiopian state.
The church itself was believed to be the crucial institutional link bonding all the warring
regions of the country, and was even connected to the language conflict that emerged
between Tigray and Amhara as noted in this example:
Continuity, once again, was provided by the Church: and the site of continuity of
the Ethiopian Church, scene in the fourth century of Ezana’s conversion and
Frumentius’ ministry, was Axum in the heart of Tigray (Tadesse Tamrat
1972:2lff)143. The emergence of competition between Tigray and Amhara was
mirrored, and no doubt exacerbated, by competition within the church between
the two important centres at Axum, and the monastry at Debre Libanos in Shoa,
established by Tekie Haimanot in the thirteenth century, which sprang back into
prominence when the area was reincorporated with the southward expansion
under Menelik II. Christian competition was closely bound up with the
introduction of the mythology of the Solomonic dynasty, which ‘also marked the
beginning of a competition fordominance between Amhara and Tigrayan elites.73
The TPLF, from its beginning protest, started to form strong alliances through
cultural expression. “The Tigrigna-language poetry and song, the cadres, cultural troupes,
~ Ibid, 157-159.
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radio broadcasts, and cassettes that spread them were central.” These political cadres
were placed initially in specific communities; their responsibilities were to exchange
information among the locals. The cadres were to learn from the local population and
teach them over long periods of time. The resistance groups understood how important it
was to organize localities and educate the people in new nationalist ideals. Thus public
diplomacy became strategically important to rebel groups. The TPLF fronts strategically
learned about the rural populations and established better understanding on how to
mobilize them towards political change.74
During this time of mass ethnic organizing, VOA directors boasted of having a
large listening audience in different remote areas throughout Ethiopia. In addition, they
claimed that the mass population of rural locals enjoyed the broadcast and saw VOA as
their source of primary information in the country.75 This statement confirms VOA’s
claims:
A number of those interviewed in October 1999 also privately noted the
potentially desirable implications of standardizing and unifying the ‘Welamo
cluster’ including the prospect of TV and radio programming in what would
become the fourth most widely spoken Ethiopian language.76
From the beginning of revolt in 1979, The TPLF embodied an ideology of ethnic
identity. The very name of the movement became a source and symbol of ethnic pride
~ Ibid, 164.
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and self-reliance. The last years of Selassie’s rule caused open discrimination in terms of
education, allocation of employment, thus creating resentment among the intellectual
class towards the government. The youth would later join the intelligentsia in resenting
the government when social oppression and denial of equal opportunity continued. This
unhappiness caused a massive division eventually amongst the Tigray. The formation of
TPLF occurred in 1975. The organization started among the intelligentsia and university
students inspired by the mass level of poverty, underdevelopment, and constant
discrimination being carried out toward the masses. The official recognition of the
Amharic language exacerbated the unequal status of the Tigray people, as stated:
Tigray, problems increasingly perceived as the result of a deliberate and
ethnically-motivated government policy of discrimination against the northern
region. If these experiences generated a non-specific disgruntlement, what marked
the boundary of a much more specific ‘us’ and ‘them’ was undoubtedly the
requirement in Haile Selassie’s modernising centralising empire state to speak and
write the language of the imperial regime — Amharic. Language had come to mark
a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to an extent that shaped their decisions asthe
student radicals moved to armed activities.77
The Tigrayan people organized and centralized their region through poetry and
song, cadres, radio broadcasting and cassettes. The nationalist movement invested highly
in spreading the Tigrigna language and curriculum. At the time VOA broadcasted
information in different languages, which eventually helped in the overthrow of
Mengistu. The broadcast was well aware of this language divide and understood the
significant effect it had on organizing the people. Consequently, the radio broadcast
~ Ibid, 163.
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helped to stir the majority of the population towards mobilizing for social and political
change. The masses of people in these remote areas were illiterate; therefore the
broadcast help to inform those who could not read.78
Oromo
Oromo mobilization started amongst the intelligentsia as well. Oromo students
began circulating political papers in neighboring areas around 1971. The group was in
constant contact with the Ethiopia People’s Liberation Front, which carried out effective
counter strategies on DERG’S land reform in 1974. During this same year OLF came into
existence and adopted a secessionist program for this region of the country. Oromo
nationalism was harder to establish in local communities due to the lack of education,
communication, transportation, media, and distance between people. These great divides
hindered the emergence of national consciousness amongst the Oromo people. This was
in fact influenced by external forces as well. Ethiopia’s ruling elites “did everything
possible to prevent the united front by destroying Oromo religious and cultural
institutions. By dividing the Oromo along religious and regional lines, and most of all by
undermining the growth of the Oromo language and the flourishing of written literature





Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
Despite these vast issues causing a strain towards ethnic organizing, the groups
would later succeed in deposing Mengistu. This success was brought about through news
media. In 1983, after many meetings, the TPLF and OLF, along with other diverse groups
held meetings that led to a massive joint press release and statement. Eventually it was
announced that the two organizations would work together to overthrow their common
enemy. This account of ERPDF’s recruitment and training shows the significance that
political education played on organizing the rebel forces and eventually overthrowing
Mengistu:
I was involved from the beginning [of the establishment of the zone]. I was a
soldier in the Dergue’s army and was captured by the TPLF in [February 1989] at
the battle of Shire [in western Tigray]. I stayed in Tigray until [October 1989].
We had political education about the nature of the Dergue and the ERPDF. Our
teachers were a Welleye and a Tigrayan. The group of POWs were given the
choice whether to stay in Tigray or go back to the Dergue (700 chose this option)
or go to Sudan (100 did this but they found it not conducive so they returned to
us).
In fact, education became one of the main attributes sought out by rebel forces
when seeking recruits for the attempted overthrow of DERG. As the government
collapsed, small groups of kindred EPRDF fighters moved ahead and talked to “elders
and opinion formers” of their own ethnic groups to help forge an alliance against the
regime; they became equal partners in the struggle for liberation. This strategy of using
political education to unite the people at the grassroots level started from the “ubiquitous
Peace and Stability Committees.” These committees set up proto-administrators that
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proclaimed the organization’s ideology while seeking to recruit members. The POW
education training schools were hidden in the mountains of Tigray, and were hard for the
government to contain during the movement. The peace and stability committee method
of enlisting new members to the struggle helped organize and expand the overall mission.
This account details of how political education helped to consolidate the members under
one main mission and goal of securing liberty:
Those of us who were chosen all went to Awassa for training. We attended
meetings, and stayed there for a month. We studied how Ethiopia had been during
the Dergue, then about EPRDF and its policies. After the month they said to us
‘you four are teachers: you have already got the idea, so you should go back to the
area and teach the people why it is that EPRDF has come to help them’. In
particular we had to tell people about the need for them not to sell their land. So
then the four of us who were more experienced returned home, whilst the
others.. 80
What was born in the movement was the proof of the effectiveness political
education could have on uniting people towards a common goal. The practice of
democratic participation and ideas began to spread throughout the country. These were
similar themes promulgated by United States during the Cold War - the same ideas of
democratization and political participation that were intertwined in the overall struggle
for liberation during Ethiopia’s Civil War. As the TPLF founder member notes, “Inherent
in the EPRDF’s attachment to the idea of nationality-based mobilization, along with the
idea that it is morally better than other forms (i.e. that ethnic self-determination is
democratic, emancipatory, non-discriminatory for the first time in Ethiopia’s history, and
80 Ibid, 189.
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therefore a good thing), is the idea that it works better - i.e. that people are more
responsive to political education and encouragement given to them” (Mekelle, October
1998). 81
VOA Involvement in Ethiopia’s Civil War
The Voice of America’s activities in Ethiopia were highly linked to the regional
conflicts that occurred in the country. VOA found itself in the middle of a governmental
and political battle between a variety of political organizations. To properly examine the
overall effects of VOA in Ethiopia, one must understand the distinctive languages in
which VOA broadcasted and how this influenced public opinion and at times lead to
political conflict within the organization.
During the civil war, VOA assisted different political groups by airing their views
and allowing their voices to be broadcasted. As previously mentioned, a massive student
movement grew in Ethiopia during the 1 970s and from these events came many other
organizations such as the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), the Ethiopian
Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON),
and later on, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). VOA expanded its programming to air
in Amharic to assist in countering Mengistu’s domination of the media and Soviet
influence within Africa. This countering stream of information caused major strife within
Mengistu’s regime, and later led to the broadcast being jammed.
8~ Ibid
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Historically, VOA is known to have contributed to the opposition group Ethiopia
People’s Revolutionary Party. One must also take into consideration that as mentioned in
chapter two, VOA used many domestic workers in the foreign territories to help gather
local stories and news events. Consequently, many of these Ethiopian staff workers had
their very own political views as well as a connection to individual ethnic oppositional
groups that sought a means to promote their distinct agendas through mass media. It is
known that many Ethiopians in top positions of VOA aimed to change the agency’s
coverage towards a specific organization’s political views. VOA attempted to stay neutral
by airing in three distinct Ethiopian languages. However, each of these staff members and
ethnic organizations had the opportunity to explain the news favorable to their distinctive
population and national concerns. This reveals that operations were being carried out in
disregard to VOA policies. In addition, it shows the ability to use the VOA broadcast for
other political and diplomatic means. These independent acts of staff members reveal the
influence political education had on the Ethiopian civil conflict.
The President of the TGE during this time noted how political education
influenced the outcome of the nation’s policies transitioning to more democratic
endeavors after having socialist sentiment:
The ethnic group represents the highest effective level where such collective
participation is deemed possible. What the Front calls ‘popular democracy’ is
based on communal collective participation, and representation based on
consensus. Its perception of democracy is shaped partly by ideological
conditioning, and partly by historical experience, fusing class theory with
ethnicity. The validity of Marxist and Maoist precepts of mass political
mobilisation were confirmed by the TPLF’s success in Tigray, where the
peasantry was mobilised on an ethnic basis, which became also the mode of
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political participation and representation: The only coalition we seek is with the
people; and the democratization we seek is the democratisation of society and





The research yields important facts regarding the mission and activities of VOA
in Africa. The Eritrean and Ethiopian government were well aware of VOA’s goals on
the continent. VOA has a wide audience of Ethiopian listeners: 24% of the adult
population which represents about 7.3 million weekly listeners. Consequently, this was
the highest listening audience for VOA of any one country. VOA struggled to keep itself
separate from USIA’s mission. Unfortunately, the organization could not stay completely
clear of USIA’s objectives. The USIA included editorials in VOA broadcasting, which
followed a statement explaining that the views spoken are those of the United States’
government. At times, the US Department of State has requested VOA to restrain or
delay from mentioning some information that may be deemed harmful to American
foreign Policy objectives. Thus, VOA’s agenda in the past, whether intentional or not,
has been consistent with the goals of USIA and the State Department.
While the mandate of the Voice of America has often been legitimatized as an
“educational service,”83 its history has proven otherwise. The VOA broadcasted from
transmitters in 15 different countries, in 49 different languages, and with over 2,000
83 Hell, Voice ofAmerica: a histoiy, 449.
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hours of content each week.84 The fact that it does broadcast in 49 different languages
proves that its purpose extends well beyond providing information for Americans living
abroad. During the Cold War, VOA served as a source of information with an anti-
communist agenda. However, while seen as problematic and in need of a clearer
definition for its purpose, the agency remains useful in places like Ethiopia where the
concentration of media is held in very few hands and only presents the current
government’s policies and positions. Thus, VOA is a force for change against tyranny in
Ethiopia, and has proven successful. This is why its signal gets jammed and banned as a
media source in the region.
During the Cold War, VOA was unquestionably a vehicle for anti-communist
ideals.85 The organization began broadcasting in the Amharic language in the early 80’s
as a means to combat communism in Ethiopia. Amharic is the official language of the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.86
VOA became an important anti-communist vehicle during the period that
followed the rule of Emperor Seleassie. From 1975 to 1977, when the communist regime
DERG took power, an internal conflict plagued Ethiopia and in the immediate period
following the rise of the DERG, they had to combat both an invasion from Somalia and
84 Elliott, Kim Andrew, “Too Many Voices of America ,‘ Washington Post Newsweek No. 77,
(Winter 1989-1990): 113-131.
85 Heil, Voice ofAinerica: a histoiy, 350.
86 Ibid, 349.
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an insurrection in the Eritrea, a region that sought independence. 87 Ethiopia was mainly
supported by the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba. The DERG was well-known for
corruption in diverting or, essentially, stealing US and other foreign aid that was coming
in the country to alleviate the effects of famine. 88The Derg officially came to an end in
1987 because of a referendum that established a new constitution and more democracy.
The initiative for the referendum was brought about by the People’s Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia, which shared power with the communist Derg until the fall of communism in
1989; and, then the succession of that government by the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) who were supported by the United States. In
1991, the EPRDF took power under Meles Zenawi. Zenawi was from Tigray and a
supporter of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), who managed to create unity
in Ethiopia under the ERRDF which was founded in 1989.89
The relationship between the EPRDF and the VOA was fairly challenging.
Zenawi who famously made the following criticism, was successful in getting it removed
by blocking the actual broadcast signal. “We have been convinced for many years that in
many respects, the VOA Amharic Service has copied the worst practices of radio
stations, such as, Radio Mille Collines, of Rwanda in its wanton disregard of minimum
ethics ofjournalism and engaging in destabilizing propaganda.” The reference to the
87 Abraham, Kinfe, Ethiopia: From Bullets to the Ballot Box: The Bumpy Road to Democracy and




Radio Mule Collines is both an inflammatory accusation and basically inaccurate,
referring to radio broadcasts that were viewed as responsible for the massive genocide
that occurred in Rwanda. Further, Zenawi was criticized by the international community
and organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, which published a report outlining the
basic transgression of rights over the twenty year period in which the EPRDF had been in
power. Included among these recommendations and criticisms was an emphasis on a
‘free’ and open media in line with the existing Constitution of Ethiopia, according to
Human Rights Watch in May 2010. Zenawi made significant moves to consolidate his
power through the control of the media, and as mentioned, viewed the VOA as
subversive enough that he adopted the very expensive measure of actually blocking their
broadcast signal.
In terms of this early period of development for the VOA in Ethiopia, the VOA
established the “Horn of Africa” service.90 During this period after the fall, because of the
independence that was being sought by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
for Eritrea; the VOA switched its mandate in this period to being more inclusive of
various movements striving towards sovereignty. It is important to stress that they were
trying to provide a voice for all perspectives in Ethiopia at that time. Initially, VOA had
two female broadcasters who would be able to accommodate those regions that were
uprising. They were Tizita Belachew, who spoke Afan Oromo, and Adanech Fessehaye,
~° Heil, Voice ofAinerica: a history, 267.
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who spoke Tigrean,9’ which covered the major languages in Ethiopia along with
Amharic, but also the different nationalities that were seeking independence from
Ethiopia. Consequently, it can be argued that VOA was seeking to be as inclusive and
non-partisan as possible. Had they limited their services through this period to Amharic
alone, it would have signified a bias in favor of one group over and against those who
were seeking their own independence from Ethiopia. “VOA would stay on the air with
exactly the same amount of airtime as Ethiopians and Tigreans in neighboring Eritrea
would benefit as well.”92
Because of the appearance of support and independence for oppositional groups
VOA was harshly criticized and the directors of the Horn of Africa service had to answer
to a panel hearing which former Director Geoffrey Cowan dealt with personally. It was
under Cowan’s direction that the VOA should be inclusive along with the harsh criticism
that he faced, which nearly led to the complete collapse and dismantling of the VOA.93
Under President Clinton, the VOA was limited in its use, but Cowan successfiully
defended the value of the service.94 The value of VOA would be reinforced or proven





~ Milkias, Paulos. Ethiopia,( Santa Barbara, CA,: ABC-CLIO, 2011:72.
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By 1994, the pressure placed on Clinton by diplomats was intense, and they were
calling for the dismantling of VOA. The agency was seen as a reflection of the
obsolescence of Cold War practices. Coincidentally, with the fall of the Soviet Empire in
1989, the VOA survived by redefining its overall mandate and regained legitimacy in the
broadcast industry from its previous references to an essentially anti-communist mandate
that worked well after its origination. Moreover, its usefulness proved significant because
in those years the Rwandan crisis and various other problems in Africa were seen as
problematic enough to maintain the radio service.96 One of the strategies that changed in
this period was the shift away from American news toward more locally oriented news,97
and the linguistic changes made during that period were very much a part of this new
mandate.
The problem with the VOA was not solely viewed as a criticism from foreign
countries. From the vantage point of the US, a number of criticisms of the VOA have
focused on how the “market”98 ought to serve the interests of foreign policy abroad. In
this sense, it is simply an opinion that argues that governments have no business
conducting a broadcast, which can just as easily be done by privately owned and
independent media. Moreover, there is now a long-standing position among the critics of
VOA and the US that the purpose of the broadcast system is no longer relevant.
96 Heil, Voice ofAmerica: a history, 261.
~ Elliott, “Too Many Voices of America, 127.
98 Ungar, Sanford J, “Pitch Imperfect (VOA).” Foreign Affairs,(Winter, 2005):15.
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Established under the war time conditions and pretenses of 1942 and continued
throughout the Cold War after 1989, the mandate of the VOA has become hard to define,
as it is essentially an instrument of war even if the war is a “cold” one, so to speak.
Without communism, the very existence of the VOA has been rigorously called into
question.99
While the adaptation to other languages has the appearance of carrying forward an
educational service, it can be argued that this service can easily be done with an
organization without so much political baggage. It has been argued in this analysis that
however useful it was in Ethiopia, the VOA’s purpose has become questionable.
However, it has also been emphasized that VOA has been a source of liberation and
freedom against the tyranny of several regimes. The fact that it has been blocked and
questioned over the past few decades proves that the VOA has been a force for change
and challenging the various tyrannical regimes discussed in this analysis. It becomes even
more relevant as the United States is currently challenged with a war on terror globally.
The mandate of VOA in contemporary terms was to influence the process of
democratization in Africa; and, it has been argued (and proven) that VOA can be utilized
in the pursuit of this goal. There exists a delicate balance between a mandate of spreading
“consciousness elevation,” that is to say stimulate critical examination of the government
and what is known to be the more outer edges of this process that transcend into
~ Ibid.
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propaganda. Thus, Ethiopia has recently jammed the signals of VOA, it can be
maintained that these mandates are already underway in the country, which is currently
causing the radio broadcasts to be interpreted as subversive. It is argued that while radio
broadcasts or the media can influence the process of democratization, there is still much
work to be done on measuring or understanding the fullness of its affect on the masses.
Therefore this study is still relatively in its infancy stage.
At the onset, it is stressed that in order for VOA to avoid being merely seen as an
institution of propaganda and to maintain its charter that there had to be an important
distinction between messaging and radio content. How democratization has spread is
varied and complex. There is no uniform or single process that can define or explain this
process; however, there are a number of general guiding principles that mostly concern
how attitudes and opinions are formed. OsKamp and Shultz (2005) argue that the
formation of attitudes and opinions concern six different variables including genetic and
physiological factors:1 °°direct personal experience, parental influence,101 group
determinants of attitudes,102 mass media’°3 and the learning process in attitude
formation.’°4 While the focus of this analysis is “mass media,” Oskamp and Shultz~s
‘°° Shultz, Stuart Oskamp and P. Wesley. Attitudes and Opinions. Third Edition.





schema recognizes that changing belief systems or attitudes at large is not solely a factor
of mass media. Rather, it is the outcome of a variety of forces or influences, all of which
have varying degrees of impact that are largely different such that they are difficult to
compare.
Regarding the influence of media, they point to two succinct ways in which it
shapes opinion: the “direct effects model” and the “indirect effects model.”°~ The direct
effects approach was largely a view where audiences were understood as “passive”
recipients, while the “indirect effects model” is the perspective that dominates the current
literature, and it views the audience or recipients as “active participants” in the process of
the acquisition of knowledge or beliefs.106 At the same time that the media is articulated
as significant in the shaping of beliefs and opinions, it is important to stress that, “we
know much more about media exposure than media effects”’°7 While we can say
definitely that media is significant in shaping opinions and beliefs, such as the values
maintained that go into validating democracy, the state of the current science of
cognition, does not have that much definitive information on how this process works or






mass communications is based on the premise that there are effects from the media, yet it
seems to be the issue on which there is least certainty and least agreement.”108
In terms of what we do know, there is a good argument to be made between
democratization and media exposure. First, and what is particular to the developing world
including, of course, Africa, is that literacy rates are low. That means that information
dissemination through conventional media like print is relatively limited - and even cost
prohibitive. Indeed, the cost of television and internet is likewise comparatively high in
comparison with radio. One important point about the prospects ofutilizing the VOA for
the purposes of educational programming that might lead to political reform is that radio
in Africa is already the most popular and pervasive media form.109 Indeed, state run radio
in Africa is already commonplace and generally regarded as a tool of legitimacy for any
given political state. There is an intimate connection between the use of state radio in
Africa, and propaganda.110 In other words, by instituting a state broadcasting system
which is arguably based on European models such as the BBC in the United Kingdom, it
is already being acknowledged by this very process of establishing radio that can be a
powerful influence on the entire continent.
~ McQuail, Dennis, Mass Communication Theory,”(London: Sage, 1991):251.
109 Ellis, Stephen, “Tuning in to pavement radio,” African Affairs 88, (July, 1989): 323.
~ Schramm, D Lerner & Wilbur, Communications and Change in the Developing Countries.
(Honolulu, HI: East-West Center Press, 1967): 20.
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There is limited information concerning the actual evaluation of the effectiveness
of radio broadcasting. It is not to say that the use of radio is not pervasive, and as
mentioned so far that there is now a long relationship between the media and politics in
Africa. A number of important studies have outlined the significance of radio particularly
within the developing world and Africa. For instance, Zaffiro maintains that there is a
positive correlation between media and radio in Botswana, and the movement toward
democratization,” but again, this connection is difficult to evaluate. This is echoed by
George who studied the use of radio in both Zimbabwe and Kenya,”2 and by Randall
whose study examines the use of media and radio in a number of different African
nation-states”3 as well as by Kuenzi (2005) in the context of 14 Randall goes so
far as to argue that there is a correlation between democratization in Africa and the use of
radio, but at the same time it is difficult to prove that this correlation is a causal
relationship. The evidence for this is limited and to conduct a study of this scope would
involve finding a very concrete link between media and political change. As mentioned at
the outset of this analysis, such a causal relationship remains evasive.
~ Zaffiro, James,” ‘The press and political opposition in an African democracy: the case of
Botswana’,” 16. James Zaffiro, ‘The press and political opposition in an Afri Journal ofCommonwealth and
Comparative Poliiics,( November, 1989): 32.
112 George, Nancy, “Using Radio for Community Mobilization: Experiences in Zimbabwe and
Kenya, Vol. 7No. 2, (Summer, 1993): 59.
‘‘3 Randall, Vicky, “The media and democratisation in the Third World.” Third World
Quarterly, (Summer, 1993): 74.
~ Kuenzi, Michelle. “The Role of Nonformal Education in Promoting Democratic Attitudes:
Findings From Senegal,” Democratisation, (July, 2005): 237,
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In sum, this paper has analyzed the prospects for VOA as an influence in the
democratization of Ethiopia. It has been argued that while the use of media is pervasive
in African politics that there is a limited amount of independent media at the same time.
It is not the case that there are studies that show or demonstrate with empirical clarity, a
relationship between the existence of broadcasting that is educational in scope,
independent, and focused on democratic ideals, and the emergence of democracy. It can
be argued in this sense that while there is a very powerful correlation there is also the
assumption by political regimes that they ought to control or nationalize the media. Much
research remains to definitely prove that there can be a causal relationship between radio
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